To Protect or to Serve:
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I.

Introduction
[I]n a cold blooded executioner’s style, [he] murdered his wife and his mother-inlaw …. The weapon, a shotgun, is hardly known for the surgical precision with
which it perforates its target. The murder scene, in consequence, can only be
described in the most unpleasant terms…. The police eventually found her
facedown on the floor with a substantial portion of her head missing and her
brain, no longer cabined by her skull, protruding for some distance onto the floor.
Blood not only covered the floor and table, but dripped from the ceiling as well.1
As counsel sits at the courthouse waiting for her client to appear for a civil

protective order hearing, thoughts run through the attorney’s head. The client is fifteen
minutes late, twenty, and then thirty. The judicial assistant has advised that the case will
be dismissed in the next fifteen minutes and counsel has already made five unsuccessful
attempts to contact the client by telephone. Counsel spoke to the client the night before
and confirmed that she would appear for the trial. The client seemed nervous and had
some doubts about following through with the matter but agreed to appear. The client is
victim of serious physical abuse spanning the past seven years, has made three
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Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 449 (1980). The description of the murder scene by Justice White in
his dissenting opinion in Godfrey, joined by Justice Rehnquist, is used merely as an illustration. The facts
in Godfrey provide the reader with a vivid picture of the heinous and deadly results domestic violence can
have on battered women, children and, as in this case, other family members.
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unsuccessful attempts to leave her abuser in the past, and has been hospitalized once as a
result of a beating she received from her abuser. He fractured her ribs, blackened her
eye, broke her tooth, bloodied her mouth and caused contusions to her face and neck.
The perpetrator has hit, kicked and slapped the victim on a routine basis. He has
threatened to kill her on two prior occasions, neither reported to the police. The victim
has been locked in the basement and held against her will for extended periods of time.
Further, the abuser has isolated the victim from friends and family to such extremes that
all personal relationships have been terminated. There are no neighbors, friends or
family members for counsel to call to find out if the client is on her way to court. The
victim refused to stay in a shelter and remained in the marital home after obtaining an ex
parte order the week prior to the scheduled trial. Pursuant to the ex parte order, the
abuser was removed from the household pending the full hearing. Respondent, who has
threatened suicide in the past, has not appeared for the trial either. The first thought
counsel may have is, “has the victim been threatened or harmed by the abuser in an
attempt to prevent her from going forward with the case?” What should counsel do?
One possibility is to request a continuance, informing the judge that counsel is
concerned for the victim’s safety and can only imagine that the client has a very good
reason why she has not appeared. This option can be accomplished without providing
any confidential information and simply referring to the information contained in the
record from the filing of the civil petition for protection. If the case is continued, counsel
has some time to locate the client and proceed with the matter.
A second option is to advise the court that counsel is concerned that some harm
has come to the client given the severity of the past abuse in this case and request
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guidance from the court. Such an option may require a more extensive dialogue with the
court and the need to disclose some confidential information not contained within the
petition for protection or the court record.
A third approach is for counsel to contact the police and request that they go to
the victim’s residence to check on her. However, this option may require the disclosure
of confidential information. Suppose counsel chooses to have the police drive by the
victim’s home only to find the client on her front lawn speaking with neighbors. The
client is, at that moment, fine and later advises counsel that she has no interest in
pursuing the matter. Does the attorney have an obligation to take further action for the
protection of the client under such a set of facts?
A fourth option is to simply do nothing. Allow the case to be dismissed and
attempt to reach the client at a later time in an effort to file for protection in the future.
Such a decision would be in keeping with a cautious approach to client confidentiality
and in support of the autonomy of the victim-client. Would our perspective change,
however, if the result is deadly? Imagine the next day counsel picks up the morning
newspaper only to find that the client was shot and killed by her abuser.
To determine which of these or other options should be chosen, we must first
determine whether it is counsel’s role to step beyond the bounds of the attorney-client
relationship and become decision maker for the client, a protector or even an extension of
law enforcement.
Representing victims of domestic violence presents choices and dilemmas unlike
those faced by most lawyers because domestic violence involves shocking and horrible

3

acts that occur behind closed doors with few, if any, witnesses. 2 The abuse battered
women experience is very real. Victims are beaten, burned, kicked, punched, hit,
slapped, choked, and threatened with a variety of weapons. Battered women endure a
multitude of verbal attacks by their perpetrators in an attempt to denigrate and humiliate
them on a daily basis. Sadly, victims are rarely able to free themselves from the violence
given the increased risks associated with separation,3 the dynamics of the abusive
relationship,4 and the failure on the part of our society to provide the battered woman
with the resources necessary to safely and permanently stay away.5

2

The author knows all too well that these situations do occur, having represented clients brutally beaten
and in some instances ultimately murdered by their abusers. There is something about having a client killed
that forever alters the thought process and deliberation of that attorney in the representation of subsequent
clients and the handling of similar situations. As a member of the Delaware bar since 1992, the author has
represented hundreds of battered women in court and provided advice to many more representing over
3015 hours of legal advice and service to victims of domestic violence. As the former supervising attorney
and now the director of the Delaware Civil Clinic, in partnership with Delaware Volunteer Legal Services
(DVLS), law students under my supervision have provided legal advice and representation to 1210 abused
women and children. I have also worked with and provided training to many attorneys doing pro bono
work through DVLS in their representation of hundreds more battered women.
3
See Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28 Oct Colo. L. Rev. 19,
19 (1999)(citing Barbara Hart, National Estimates and Facts About Domestic Violence, NCADV Voice, p.
12 (Winter 1989) “a battered woman is 75 percent more likely to be murdered when she tries to flee or has
fled, than when she stays.”)) Perpetrators are typically unwilling to give up their perceived control of the
victim even after the battered woman ends the relationship. Such an increased desire on the part of the
batterer to regain control over the victim often places the battered woman in greater danger. See generally
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L.
Rev. 1, 6-7 (1991)(assigning a name to the invisible link that remains between the battered woman and her
abuser once she attempts to end the relationship. Mahoney explains that, “by emphasizing the urgent
control moves that seek to prevent the woman from ending the relationship, the concept of separation
assault raises questions that inevitably focus additional attention on the ongoing struggle for power and
control in the [battering] relationship.”
4
Mary Ann Dutton, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence: Understanding the Response from Battered
Women, 68-OCT Fla. B.J. 24 (1994). According to Dutton domestic violence is a pattern of behavior that
over time changes the nature of the relationship causing both individuals to understand the “meaning of
specific actions and words.” Id. at 24. Dutton explains that as a result of this special relationship the
victim learns to read the abuser’s actions, the meaning of which “extends far beyond what is being said or
done in the moment.” Id. The victim learns that a certain look from the perpetrator may mean that she is in
significant danger if she does not conform to his wishes, for the battered woman it is this simple act that
alters her behavior in such significant ways.
5
Videotape: Defending Our Lives (Cambridge Documentary Films, Inc.1993). Professor Sarah Buel
outlines the total failure on the part of our system to protect and support the battered woman in her struggle
to end the violence in her life.
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An attorney faced with a client who voluntarily returns to or remains in an
abusive relationship will likely have to make difficult choices. This article will discuss
situations in which an attorney might wish to notify the authorities about a risk to the
client and weigh those situations against his or her duty to maintain client confidences,
respect client autonomy and, most importantly, ensure the safety of the victim.6 For the
attorney who wishes to act for the protection of the client, the 2002 amendments to the
Revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1),7 in particular, may provide
a safe harbor in limited situations and in those states adopting the changes. According to
Revised Model Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;8
All too often the risk of serious physical injury faced by those who endeavor to
survive domestic violence is very real. Research, however, shows that future violence is
difficult to predict. 9 Cases that appear life threatening may not result in additional acts of
violence while others that seem harmless may end in serious injury or even death.
The safest option for the victim may be temporarily to remain in or return to the
abusive relationship. For some legal scholars, the decision may appear to be clear, do
6

It should be noted at the outset that the writer is not making the case that the issue is as simple as a choice
between the protection of life and the protection of information. One would hope that such a dilemma
would be resolved in favor of the protection of a human life, but the choice as it relates to domestic
violence is not as clear as it may be in any other area of practice. Preventing harm in the context of
intimate partner violence may in fact require the protection of information to ensure the protection of a
human life. See infra Section IX, notes xxx (265-274) and accompanying text.
7
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (2002) [hereinafter Revised Model Rules].
8
Revised Model Rule 1.6.
9
See generally Symposium, Playing the Psychiatric Odds: Can We Protect the Public by Predicting
Dangerous? 20 Pace L. Rev. 263 (2000)( detailing the difficulty of predicting risk in domestic violence
cases).
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what is morally right, not what may be considered professionally correct.10 Hence, act
for the protection of the client even if that should require the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. But doing what is right is not always as clear as it may seem.
The right answer as it relates to duty and integrity in the context of domestic violence
may be very different from what seems obvious.
What then is the lawyer to do? Domestic violence cases are complex and do not
lend themselves to a one size fits all mentality. Likewise, victims of domestic violence
cannot be viewed as a “single group with the same problems.”11 These complex cases
involve individuals with unique circumstances which require individualized responses,
given the facts of each case.
The attorney who conducts a thorough investigation with the victim-client for the
purpose of assessing the case will likely gain information that could be used to assess the
risk of harm to a battered woman. As a result, an attorney may be inclined to make rash
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See generally Professor Susan R. Martyn, Are We Moving in the Right Dimension? Sadducees, Two
Kingdoms, Lawyers, and the Revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 Val. U.L. Rev. 121 (1999).
The ultimate outcome of a particular case may depend in part upon the decision making process of the
attorney involved. This is particularly true in situations resulting in possible disclosures of confidential
information pursuant to Rules 1.6, because it does not mandate action. The attorney is not told what to do
but instead is faced with the exercise of discretion. Although beyond the scope of this article, for analysis
of the role of morality and legal decision-making see Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, The Rules, and
Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical
Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 411, 452 (2005); Walter H. Bennett, Jr., Making Moral Lawyers:
A Modest Proposal, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 45, 46 (1986)(defining morality and moral in varying terms such
as right or wrong, good and bad); Gordon J. Beggs, Proverbial Practice: Legal Ethics From Old Testament
Wisdom, 30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 831, 846 (1995)(Beggs suggests that the ethical practice of law “is not
possible absent foundational moral values.” His essay is a look at the Old Testament book of Proverbs and
uses them as a guide for ethical legal practice.); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 Ohio
St. L.J. 551, 609 (1991)(arguing that in the process of balancing legal and moral obligations, attorneys may
chose to disregard their duties, “so long as their reasons for doing so are good reasons.”); and Samuel J.
Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously, Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 Ind. L. Rev.
21, 48 (2003).
11

Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the Control of the
Abuser, 88 Geo. L.J. 605, 627 (2000).
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judgments about the need for legal intervention in a particular case. But rash judgments
can prove to be deadly, as the act of disclosure may place the client at greater risk.
The issue, in fact, comes down to who should be making decisions about client
safety for an individual who is made fully aware of the risks associated with her actions.
If we are to believe that confidentiality “promotes respect for human autonomy by
guaranteeing trust and privacy in the lawyer-client relationship,”12 how are we to behave?
The concept of promoting autonomy for our client runs contrary to any argument that we
as lawyers are to make life altering decisions for our clients. Instead, if we are to see the
battered woman as a strong survivor and not as weak and helpless victim, we can arm her
with the information necessary to make critical decisions about her own safety.
Moreover, these issues may not be at odds because preventing harm to a battered woman
may in fact require the protection of information to ensure the protection of a human life.
And so, the goal of this article is to provide information about the ethical realities
of representing battered women. The article begins in Section II with a brief overview of
the unique characteristics of the victim-client and provides basic information to help
counsel make informed decisions in representing her. The victim of domestic violence is
unique given the treatment she has received from her batterer, society and the legal
system. It follows that counsel’s response to the victim-client must consider those
differences.
Section III discusses circumstances under which an ethical dilemma can arise,
with concrete examples of the problem as it exists when the client returns to or remains in
the abusive relationship.
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See Professor Susan R. Martyn, In Defense of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality…And Its Exceptions…, 81
Neb. L. R. 1320, 1323.
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Section IV considers the special and unique relationship that can exist between
the victim-client and her counsel, which is not typically found in other areas of practice.
To properly respond to ethical issues, counsel must be aware of this relationship and how
the attorney’s actions can affect the safety of the victim. The victim-client requires a
connection with her counsel different from the standard attorney-client relationship and
counsel must learn to adapt to the different requirements of the association to safely
represent the client.
Section V discusses the duty of confidentiality and how the rules that guide our
profession must be adapted to serve the victim-client. Confidentiality is the foundation of
the relationship between any client and her counsel. A client must be able to trust and
confide in her attorney to enable the attorney to provide appropriate advice and
representation.13 However, the duty to protect the client’s information can cause an
ethical dilemma for an attorney desiring to do what is appropriate for a client who faces a
serious risk of harm and yet feels she has no choice but to remain in or return to the
abusive home.
The attorney’s decision whether to disclose to authorities, even if protected, is a
difficult one. Section VI will focus on the potential reaction of courts and disciplinary

13

See Revised Model Rule 1.6, comment 2 for the underlying policies of confidentiality as it relates
to the attorney-client relationship (“A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in
the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the
representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that
is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal
assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if
necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients
come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations,
deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow
the advice given, and the law is upheld.”)
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bodies to issues of protection and confidentiality. The issue is not just a question of
client protection but also a matter of ensuring that the attorney’s decisions will not be
subject to review. Creating a safe harbor for attorneys may provide the assurances
necessary to encourage them to engage in the ethical deliberation necessary to reach the
best decision for the client.
Section VII will focus on the complex process of predicting harm to the client and
provides examples of potentially useful risk assessment tools. Research in the area of
risk assessment is very new and there is extensive debate on the usefulness of the tools
available. The problems inherent in risk assessment and its influence on the outcome of
the decisions made by counsel will be addressed, as will be the extent to which the
victim’s own assessment of risk should be taken into consideration.
For the victim-client who has been, in many cases, stripped of her independence
by her batterer, counsel’s attempts to substitute his or her judgment for the victim may
only replace “the control of the batterer with the control of [counsel].”14

Further, what

counsel may believe is in the best interest of the client may in fact be the most dangerous
decision for a battered woman. Understanding the risks associated with leaving a
battering relationship and the need to empower the victim is critical to providing
competent representation. Although the Model Rules permit the lawyer to take the steps
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Linda G. Mills, Institution and Insight: A New Job Description for the Battered Woman’s Prosecutor and
Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA Women’s L. J. 183 (1997). Mills considers the issue in the
context of mandatory prosecution, arguing that by forcing the decision to prosecute upon the victim the
attorney replaces the control of the batterer with that of the prosecutor. Id. Mills contends that placing the
choice in the victim’s hands may be just what she needs to stop the battering and conversely by removing
the victim’s power counsel may inadvertently force the battered woman to side with the abuser. Id. at 190191.
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he or she deems reasonably necessary to protect the client, Section VIII will balance the
limited role of Rule 1.14,15 with the importance of client autonomy in Section IX.
Sections X and XI are designed to provide the practicing attorney with examples
of how risk assessment tools and other techniques can be used to enhance representation,
minimize the number of times the dilemma arises, and help the client make better
choices. Counsel must also understand that risk assessment has its limits and that safety
planning is the key to ensuring that the client is equipped with the tools necessary to one
day permanently and safely leave an abusive relationship.
The article concludes by suggesting education and training, as well as changes to
the Model Rules to help guide the attorney to make better choices and to protect the
attorney under those limited circumstances when he or she may need to act to save a
human life.
II.

The Victim-Client16
…[women] seek assistance in proportion to the realization that they and their
children are more and more in danger. They are attempting, in a very logical
fashion, to assure themselves and their children protection and therefore survival.
Their effort to survive transcends even fearsome danger, depression or guilt, and
economic constraints. It supersedes the “giving up and giving in” which occurs

15

Revised Model Rule 1.14 (2003).
Although ethical issues arise in the representation of perpetrators of domestic violence, the subject
addressed in this article is the representation of victims of domestic violence only, not abusers. Attorneys
who represent perpetrators of domestic violence may very well have a duty to warn potential victims;
however, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this examination. For a look at counsel’s duty to warn
third parties in the context of domestic violence litigation see John M. Burman, Lawyers and Domestic
Violence: Raising the Standard of Practice, 9 Mich J. Gender & L. 207, 232 (2003). Further, the focus of
this examination applies to civil matters, not the criminal prosecution of domestic violence cases. Civil
protective proceedings differ from the criminal prosecution of cases in a number of ways. In criminal
proceedings the prosecutor makes the decision whether to proceed with the matter or dismiss the case, such
decisions can be made with or without the consent of the victim. The difference is significant in the civil
context because the decision to proceed is that of the client, not the attorney. If the client decides not to
seek protection the civil attorney may not go forward with the case no matter how dangerous the situation
or how serious the potential risks faced by the victim-client. In the criminal context, the prosecutor may
always choose to proceed for the protection of the victim, as the state is the client, not the battered woman.
Whether it is appropriate for the prosecutor to choose to proceed without the consent of the victim is
certainly an issue, but it is one that is beyond the scope of this article.

16
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according to learned helplessness. In this effort to survive, battered women, are,
in fact, heroically assertive and persistent.17
To represent a battered woman,18 an attorney must understand that her situation is
unique. Victims of domestic violence may remain in abusive relationships out of fear,19
love, shame, denial, background,20 financial constraints,21 limited choices, lack of social
services,22 family, children,23 religion,24 and even “hope that the abuser will change.” 25

17

Edward W. Gondolf and Ellen R. Fisher, Battered Women as Survivors: An Alternative to Treating
Learned Helplessness at 18 (Lexington Books 1988).
18
All reference to the victim in this article will be of the female gender. Although males are victims of
domestic violence, statistics reveal that the majority of intimate violence victims are women. See, e.g.,
Bureau of Justice Statistics Selected Findings: Violence Between Intimates (NCJ-149259), November
1994, (providing that 90 – 95% of all victims of domestic violence are women).
19
Supporting the view that victims have a realistic fear of their abusers, see Florida Governor’s Task Force
on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Florida Mortality Review Project, 1997, p. 47 (providing that 65% of
intimate homicide victims physically separated from the perpetrator prior to their death); See also Bureau
of Justice Statistics Special Report: Violence Against Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey
(NCJ-154348), August 1995, p.4 (confirming that women separated from their spouses were three times
more likely to be victimized by their spouses than their divorced counterparts, and twenty-five times more
likely than their married counterparts); See generally Neil Websdale, Understanding Domestic Homicide
at 33 (1999).
20
Despite what we would like to believe, our society continues to foster the view that the woman is
subordinate to the man and that she should defer to his decisions. Further, some women are raised to
believe that they should “stand by” their man no matter what happens in the relationship. See Lisa M.
Martinson, An Analysis of Racism and Resources for Aferican-American Female Victims of Domestic
Violence in Wisconsin, 16 Wis. Women’s L.J. 259, 281-282 (2001).
21
Some victims believe that they will simply be unable to survive without financial support from their
abuser, a fear that is valid for many abused women. One actual and very unfortunate outcome of battering
is homelessness, statistics show that domestic violence is one of the primary causes of homelessness for
women and children in the United States. See ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Domestic Violence and
Homelessness (2004) available at
http://www.aclu.org/WomensRights/WomensRights.cfm?ID=16885&c=173 referring to the National
Conference of Mayors, Hunger and Homelessness Survey 71 (December 2003) (“In 2003, 36 percent of
U.S. cities surveyed reported that domestic violence was a primary cause of homelessness. These cities
included Denver, Nashville, New Orleans, Phoenix, Norfolk, Portland, Salt Lake City, and Seattle.”). See
also Center for Impact Research, Pathways to and from Homelessness: Women and Children in Chicago
Shelters 3 (January 2004) (“In 2003 in Chicago, 56 percent of women in homeless shelters reported they
had been victims of domestic violence and 22 percent stated that domestic violence was the immediate
cause of their homelessness”).
22
Our state and local governments fail to provide the financial resources necessary for battered women to
survive. The resources available are not sufficient for many women to feed, clothe and house themselves
and their children, nor sufficient to provide for care of those children should the victim attempt to procure
employment. Because of the lack of funding, shelters are only able to provide temporary housing for
victims and their children. When time runs out, the victim and her children are often homeless. Further,
our legal system provides protective orders and yet many hearing officers refuse to provide the financial
support necessary to enable victims to remain independent from their batterers. When support is ordered
through the court, batterers rarely comply and when they are brought to court for violations of those orders
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Many of the reasons victims stay in a violent home are the same forces that lead a
battered woman to conclude that her only viable option is to return to the abuser. 26
Contrary to popular belief, the most dangerous time for a battered woman is not
when she remains in the abusive relationship. In fact, the victim of domestic violence is
at a substantially greater risk of being killed by her abuser when she attempts to leave
him.27 Given the risks associated with leaving, it is understandable that many survivors
of domestic violence are reluctant to end the abusive relationship.

they are rarely held accountable. As a result of this failure to provide for the victim and her children, we
place the battered woman in the impossible position of having to choose between poverty and abuse. See
generally Defending Our Lives, supra note 6.
23
Perpetrators will use the children as a way of maintaining control over their partner by threatening to
harm or kidnap the children if the victim attempts to leave. In the alternative, some batterers will convince
the victim that they will be able to gain custody of the children if she leaves given the lack of financial
resources available to battered women. See Patricia K. Susi, The Forgotten Victims of Domestic Violence,
54 J. Mo. B. 231, 232(1998)(“In order to protect their children, the victims of domestic violence have little
choice but to stay in an abusive relationship perpetuated by the fear that their children will become the
focus of the batterer’s aggression.”) See also Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter From the Storm: Using
Jurisdictional Statutes to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence After the Violence Against Women Act of
2000, 13 Colum. J. Gender & L. 101,106-107 (2004).
24
Although religion can be a source of strength and support for many victims of domestic violence it can
also act as a barrier to ending the abusive relationship. See Martinson, supra note 21. According to
Martinson:
Many churches are patriarchal and use the scriptures to rationalize that a woman should stay and
try to work out the problems of her marriage because she is subordinate under the word of God to
her husband. In the traditional American Christian family the father/husband is the decisionmaker and authority figure for the family. The decisions of the father/husband are not to be
questioned. For example, “one minister told a sociologist that wife-beating was on the rise
because men are no longer leaders in their homes.” Research on domestic violence shows that
“one of the significant factors contributing to a woman staying in an abusive relationship is a
traditional religious belief that the man is to be obeyed.” Id.
25
See Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their Children: Lessons From One Woman’s Story, 35 Hous.
L. Rev. 29, 43 (1998). Waits finds that statistics lack the personal element necessary when telling the full
story of domestic violence. In an effort to demonstrate the personal side to the issue, Waits conveys the
story of “Mary” a victim of domestic violence. In her story Mary explains that “battered women stay with
their abusers out of hope and fear. They hope the batterer will change; they fear what might happen if they
leave.” Id. The contradictory nature of such a statement captures the complexity of the battered woman’s
situation as she seeks to live both an ordinary and safe life.
26
See generally, Buel, supra note 6. Buel provides a comprehensive look at the real life difficulties that
survivors of domestic violence face trying to end the violent relationship and offers concrete reasons why a
victim may be forced to remain in or return to the batterer.
27
See Buel, supra note 6. For an extensive discussion of the danger level faced by the battered woman
when she attempts to leave the perpetrator see Sharon L. Gold, Why are Victims of Domestic Violence Still
Dying at the Hands of Their Abusers? Filling the Gap in State Domestic Violence Gun Laws, 91 Ky. L.J.
935, 940 (2002-2003). Gold explains that when the victim leaves the abuser the perpetrator’s power is
threatened because he has lost his control over the victim. Thus, he is likely to resort to more serious
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The system’s historic apathy also makes the battered woman’s plight unique.28
Survivors of domestic violence have been blamed for their circumstances and, in many
instances, punished for the actions of their abusers.29 Historically, police have been slow
to react to domestic calls, refusing to arrest perpetrators, 30 and leaving the victim to fend
for herself.31 The message has been loud and clear, your safety is not a priority.
Our system of justice inconsistently enters orders of protection, inadequately
enforces those orders when they are entered and fails to provide the resources necessary
measures to prove his power over the victim, which may include ultimately killing the battered woman. Id.
See also statistics supra note 20.
28
See Bernadette Dunn Sewell, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative Responses to the
Problem of Wife Beating, 23 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 983 (1998).
29
See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y 2002). The Nicholson case provides a good
example of how our society fails to hold the abuser accountable for his actions. The Court in Nicholson
found that New York’s child welfare system was punishing the victim for the actions of the perpetrator
because it was “simply easier” to take children away from their mothers than to hold the perpetrator
accountable. Further, although the agency had the ability to force the removal of perpetrators from the
home, the court found that they rarely did so. Id. at 210. The court quoted expert Laura M. Fernandez who
explained that this sends a message to victims that they are “more responsible for getting help and more
‘sick’ for being in an abusive relationship than the actual person who committed the violence.” Id. at 211.
30
Women seeking protection from their abusers continue to advise our legal clinic that police officers still
choose to allow the perpetrator to leave for a period of time to “cool off,” instead of making an arrest. A
recent illustration of the issue involves the facts in People v. Jones, 3 N.Y.3rd 491, 493 (2004), which
support the position that the police continue to refuse to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence. In Jones
the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of his live-in girlfriend. At the trial evidence was
presented that the police, prior to the killing, asked the defendant to leave “… the premises for a short time
to cool off.” When Jones returned to the home, an argument ensued and the victim was subsequently
killed. Id. See also Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements
on an Effective Innovation, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1285, 1294 (2000)(citing Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G.
Buzawa, Diomestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response 51 (1996) “Studies have shown that in
domestic abuse situations, there is ‘still persistent bias against the use of arrest,’ and the more closely
related the two parties are, the less likely officers are to arrest.” Tsai explains that one factor encouraging
this failure on the part of officers to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence is departmental policies.). See
also Jane Gordon, When Police Are Caught in the Middle, New York Times, January 23, 2005 at 3. As
recent as January 2005, a spokesman for the Connecticut State Police, Sargent J. Paul Vance, admitted that
domestic violence police training is relatively new. He explained that in the past officers would respond
slower to subsequent domestic disputes from the same address and acknowledged that officers were known
to respond to domestic calls by having people “cool off.” Id.
31
See generally Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (1984). The Torrington case provides
terrifying insight into the way law enforcement has historically responded to victims of domestic violence.
The court acknowledged that the police failed to protect Tracey Thurman over an eight month period
ending with her abuser brutally assaulting her. Ms. Thurman was stabbed in the chest, neck and throat;
beaten; kicked; and threatened. The facts reveal that some of these final abusive acts occurred while at
least one officer stood by and watched. Id. at 1525-26. See also Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice:
Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1843, 1851 (2002) (relying
on Del Martin, Battered Wives 93 (1976); Murry A. Straus et al, Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the
American Family 232-33 (1980)).
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for victims and their children to remain safe and independent.32 Key players such as
judges, lawyers and the police fail to understand the dynamics of intimate abuse and the
impact their actions will have on the safety of the victim.33
Abusers are often master manipulators who use any means available to prevent
their victims from leaving. If threats to harm the victim are unsuccessful, the abuser may
threaten or harm what the victim cares about more than herself, such as other family
members,34 pets,35 or personal items.36 In many domestic violence cases, despite the

32

ACLU Women’s Rights Project supra note 22.
The decisions made by lawyers, judges and other interveners can have similar dangerous consequences to
victim safety as do the decisions made by the victim herself. For example, if a judge enters an order of
protection but fails to provide the relief necessary for the battered woman to survive on her own, she will
be forced to return home only to face greater danger. To enter a protective order which fails to provide the
financial support necessary for the victim to survive on her own can, in some instances, be as useful as
providing no protection at all. Hence, the legal system needs to address the whole problem and respond
accordingly given all the needs of the victim.
34
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
35
The author has encountered countless women and children who survive the violence only to live with the
memory of the horrors inflicted by their abusers on the family pet. In one case in particular the perpetrator
timed his act so that the victim and the children would arrive home after school to find the horrifying scene
of the family pet hacked into so many pieces that it took several garbage bags to clean up the bloody mess.
The perpetrator knew that his act would strike fear in the victim, who had just advised him the prior
evening that she wanted a divorce. The message is clear, “Leave me and this will happen to you.” For
more on the subject see Howard Davidson, The Link Between Animal Cruelty and Child Maltreatment,
ABA Child Law Practice, June (1998) available at http://www.abanet.org/child/8-4tip.html (“A survey of
women seeking refuge in a Colorado Springs domestic violence shelter found 23.8% had observed animal
cruelty by their abusers, and a similar study in Utah found 71% of battered women with pets reporting their
animals had been threatened, harmed, or killed by their abusers. Another study of battered women’s
shelters found more than 60% of shelter directors reporting that children disclosed pets being hurt or
killed.”) See also Melissa Trollinger, The Link Among Animal Abuse, Child Abuse, and Domestic Violence,
30-SEP Colo. Law. 29 (2001) (confirming the link between animal abuse and domestic violence). See also
Gareth Rose, Pets suffer more as cruelty worsens, 2005 WLNR 11517677(citing a spokeswoman for a local
SSPCA, “And in some cases pets are used as pawns in blackmail threats by controlling partners. You get
instances where one partner, usually the man, says: ‘If you don’t do what I tell you I will beat the dog.’ We
had one case where a man killed a Labrador puppy in front of his wife and children.”) Id.
36
In recognition of the power an abuser holds over a victim by the act of destroying her property, some
states include the destruction of property in their definition of domestic abuse. See, e.g., 10 Del. C.
§1041(c) (“Intentionally or recklessly damaging, destroying or taking the tangible property of another
person” is considered abuse pursuant to Delaware’s protection from abuse act.) See also Karla Fischer et
al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2117,
2121. According to Fischer, abusers often destroy personal property “in an effort to gain control” over the
victim “or keep them in a state of fear.” Id. In support of her position Fischer cites her unpublished Ph. D.
thesis on file with the author: Karla Fischer, The Psychological Impact and Meaning of Court Orders of
Protection for Battered Women at 62 (1992)(as part of the thesis interviews were taken of 83 battered
women. Fischer found that 70% of the women surveyed acknowledged that the abuser destroyed personal
items.)
33
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serious nature of the abuse, there is little or no provable evidence of those acts of
violence. Intimate violence usually occurs under circumstances that provide few, if any,
witnesses.37 Those who do witness the violence are often incapable of articulating the
acts due to their tender age or as Leigh Goodmark explains, are too frightened to provide
any meaningful information.38
To further compound the problem, many victims who turn to the police or our
courts for help are mistreated by the system.39 For example, family services and our
courts remove children from the custody and care of women simply because the children
observe the perpetrator beat and abuse these survivors.40

37

Information based on the representation of hundreds of battered women seeking civil protective orders
against their abusers. A majority of the battered women seeking protection have been isolated from family
and friends who are unable or unwilling to appear at trial on the victim’s behalf. Moreover, because of the
nature of intimate abuse there are typically few, if any, adult witnesses to the acts of violence.
38
Information based on extensive work with child witnesses in domestic violence and related custody trials.
See also Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do for Children
in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. 237, 295-296 (1999). Goodmark explains that children are
faced with unique problems when asked to testify in a case that involves family members who have
engaged in domestic violence. “Child victims and witnesses often feel responsible for the abuser’s actions,
especially when a family member is committing the abusive acts. Children are pressured by their parents to
testify/not testify, fear physical retribution if they do testify, and often don’t want to take sides. Children
become ‘informational pawns, caught between two beloved parents and facing catastrophic loss no matter
how they choose’ to testify.” Id.
39
See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Role of
Prosecutors, Judges and the Court System, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 3, 39 (1999)(“Most judges come to
the bench with little understanding of the social and psychological dynamics of domestic violence and,
instead bring with them a lifetime of exposure to the myths that have long shaped the public’s attitude
toward the problem.” Epstein explains that such a lack of knowledge causes judges and others in the court
system to become frustrated with the victim.) See also A. Renee Callahan, Will the “Real” Battered
Woman Please Stand Up? In Search of A Realistic Legal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 Am.
U. J. Gender & L. 117, 120 (1994) (“Society’s growing awareness of the prevalence of domestic violence
resulted in an increasing perception that women were victimized not only by their partners, but also by an
uncaring judicial system.”)
40
Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp.2d 153, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that the Administration of
Children Services (ACS) had a policy and practice of removing children from the care of their mothers
based solely on the fact that these women were victims of domestic violence, in violation of their
procedural and substantive due process rights). See also Nicholson v. Scopetta, 820 N.E.2d 840
(2004)(considering three certified questions of law: (1) does the definition of neglected child include
instances in which the sole allegation of neglect is that the parent allows the child to witness domestic
violence; (2) can witnessing domestic abuse constitute danger or risk; and (3) whether witnessing abuse is
sufficient for removal of a child pursuant to the State’s laws. As to the first questions, the Court held that
more than merely witnessing domestic violence is necessary to find the child has been neglected. Id. at
844. In considering the second question the court held that the standard is a “stringent one” and that “…
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It is with this multitude of problems in mind that victims are faced with the
difficult decision of how and when to safely leave. The complex decision making
process41 of the victim-client may result in an outcome that could cause a moral or ethical
dilemma for counsel. Consequently, the issues faced by an attorney representing battered
woman,42 far surpass the rules that guide our profession and call into question the moral
values of the lawyer.43
III.

The Problem
…the average domestic violence victim leaves and returns to their relationship
five times. [They have been] battered an average of three times before law
enforcement or before anybody even knows that there is a problem. That[ ] …
[is] clouded in a tremendous amount of shame and a tremendous amount of
secrecy. Leaving is a process like it is for any relationship, the dissolution of any
relationship is a process. Very rarely do we wake up one day and say, ‘Okay. I’m
done. See you later… Even though we know that it’s bad, there’s a process that

emergency removal is appropriate where the danger is so immediate… that the child’s life or safety will be
at risk before an ex parte order can be obtained.” Id. at 853. Finally, the Court found that “… there can be
no ‘blanket presumption’ favoring removal when a child witnesses domestic violence.” Id. at 854. See
generally Maureen K. Collins, Nicholson v. Williams: Who is Failing to Protect Whom? Collaborating the
Agendas of Child Welfare Agencies and Domestic Violence Services to Better Protect and Support Battered
Mothers and Their Children, 38 New Eng. L. R. 725 (2004)(addressing the need for collaboration among
the domestic violence community and child welfare agencies to better serve and protect victims and their
children).
41
See Burman, supra note 17, at 213 (“… a victim’s reaction to domestic violence often appear counterintuitive, [and therefore] traditional approaches and assumptions to resolving a client’s problem may prove
ineffective in meeting a client’s objectives.”) For further clarification see Callahan supra note 39, at 150151 (explaining that although the battered woman’s decision to remain in the abusive relationship at first
glance may appear irrational, further consideration of the barriers she faces leaving demonstrate that her
actions are in fact reasonable.)
42
It should be noted that there are many attorneys representing battered women who do not focus on
domestic violence work in particular and are not familiar with this specialized area of practice. For an
general overview of the malpractice issues inherent in the representation of abused women see Margaret
Drew, Lawyer Malpractice and Domestic Violence: Are We Revictimizing Our Clients?, 39 Fam. L. Q. 7
(2005)(considering how often family law attorneys are willing to retain experts or seek outside assistance
for complex issues unfamiliar to counsel. Drew raises the question, “Why then are family law practitioners
so willing to risk malpractice by ignoring the facts and circumstances of family law cases that arise around
issues of domestic violence?” Id. at 9. Drew explains that there is no reason why an attorney should
handle these complex cases alone, for the client who has sufficient funds the lawyer can hire experts, for
those who do not, shelters and domestic violence advocates can provide the support and guidance
necessary. Id. at 25).
43
According to the preamble although many of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities are prescribed in the
rules, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience. The guiding principle requires that the attorney
balance his or her personal conscience with conflicting duties to the client and the court, not an easy task
for any individual. See Revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble.
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has to go on in terms of mourning and grieving and all the things that we do,
domestic violence [victims] do that, too. So the process is not different for them.
The stakes are a little bit higher in terms of their safety….44
The adult client,45 who returns to the abusive relationship, presents a moral and
ethical dilemma for the attorney. If the battered woman returns to the abusive home and
into serious danger, is it the responsibility of the lawyer to disclose confidential
information to protect the client? This issue regularly presents itself in domestic violence

44

People v. Basulto, 2003 WL 22456800, 4 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.), quoting the testimony of Jeri Darr, expert
witness in the area of domestic violence.
45
This article does not address the child-victim or the adult-victim with children. The writer has chosen
not to address the issue as it relates to the protection of children or risks associated with remaining in the
abusive home when children are involved. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this article and would
require the extensive attention of a separate piece devoted to the issue of child protection alone.
Admittedly, the mere fact that a child is present in the abusive home can drastically change the process of
deliberation, as we are no longer dealing solely with a knowing adult victim who can make informed
decisions for herself. Now there exists a living human being who in most cases is incapable of extracting
him or herself from the situation. The issue of child protection has been hotly debated among legal scholars
with some contending that the decision to remain in the abusive home is the safest action for both the
victim and her children. See Gold, supra note 28, at 940. While others argue that children are the
“forgotten victims” of domestic violence and that the violence they observe has both short and long-term
effects on the child. See Susi, supra note 24, at 231 The use of the words “decision” or “choice” as they
relate to a victim remaining in a battering relationship, however, is an ineffective way of considering the
problem. For too long our society has focused on the victim’s actions and pondered the matter in relation
to the victim’s need to remove herself from the situation. Id. at 232. Instead, if we agree that it is the
perpetrator who should be held accountable for his actions and not the victim, we can stop blaming the
victim. Id. But regardless of who is to blame for the violence, one fact remains, if the victim fails to seek
assistance and as a result her children continue to reside in an abusive home, is there a duty on the part of
counsel to act for the protection of the children? The answer to this difficult question may depend in part
on the nature of the abuse and the laws of the particular state where the attorney practices. Fortunately,
ethical reflection on the reporting of child abuse by lawyers who represent victims of domestic violence has
been the subject of attention by legal scholars. See generally Christine A. Picker, The Intersection of
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Ethical Considerations and Tort Issues for Attorneys Who Represent
Battered Women With Abused Children, 12 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 69 (1993). According to Picker:
The measure of whether to impose a duty on attorneys to report child abuse must be whether it
protects children. The majority of abused children are better off with their mothers…. if women
are discouraged from seeking restraining orders because they are fearful their attorney may contact
DSS, not only is the woman harmed, but so are the children.
Id. at 105. Picker further suggests that requiring counsel to report child abuse will not help the children if
our social service agencies are ill equipped to respond appropriately in domestic violence cases. Id. at 112.
See also Robin A. Rosencrantz, Rejecting ‘Hear No Evil Speak No Evil’: Expanding the Attorney’s Role in
Child Abuse Reporting, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 327 (1995); Bruce A. Boyer, Ethical Issues in the
Representation of Parents in Child Welfare Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1621 (1996).
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cases.46 Either the client decides not to file for protection after consulting with counsel,
fails to appear at trial, chooses to withdraw a petition for protection prior to trial, or seeks
to rescind a civil protective order once it has been entered by the court.
The most difficult situation involves the client who seeks representation and
divulges confidential information which leads counsel to “reasonably”47 conclude that the
victim is in danger of serious bodily harm or death. Subsequent to the consultation and
prior to any legal action through the court system, the client chooses to remain in or
return to the abusive relationship for a variety of reasons.48 As a result, counsel is left
wondering what, if any duty, he or she has to protect the client.
The first option an attorney may choose is to advise the client to follow through
with seeking protection.49 Such a dialogue, however, is likely to prove unsuccessful.
What next? Should the attorney divulge confidential information to protect of the client?
If so, to whom should the information be provided? The option of disclosure should be
an option of last resort for the domestic violence attorneys because the victim-client, in
particular, must be able to rely on the belief that counsel can be trusted. As we know
46

Information based on years of experience representing countless battered women seeking civil protection
orders against their abusers, as well as information from other practitioners working in the field of domestic
violence.
47
Revised Model Rule 1.6. The reference to the term reasonably comes from Revised Model Rule
1.6(b)(1). Comment 6 of Rule 1.6 describes “reasonably certain” in terms of the likelihood of harm taking
place. The comment provides that the “harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered
imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that the person will suffer such harm at a later date
if the lawyer” does not act.
48
It should be noted that the words “choose” or “choice” in the context of a battered woman’s decision to
return to or remain in an abusive home are used with some hesitation, given the possibility that the
statements will be misconstrued. The choice is in fact one that is forced upon the battered woman by the
abuser, society, social service agencies and a general failure on the part of our legal system to adequately
respond to the needs of the battered woman. For an overview of why the battered woman is unable to leave
the perpetrator see generally Buel, supra note 6.
49
Revised Model Rule 1.6. Comment 14 of Rule 1.6 suggests that an attorney should first seek to counsel
the client to take appropriate action to eliminate the need for disclosure. Revised Model Rule 2.1 provides
guidance as to the lawyer’s duty to “provide straightforward advice expressing the lawyer’s honest
assessment.” Id. and Comment 1. The obligations pursuant to Model Rule 2.1 are beyond the scope of this
article.
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from the information available, it can take a victim of domestic violence five or more
attempts to leave an abusive relationship before she is able to successfully stay away.50
The battered woman often does not have adequate resources available to remove herself
from the abusive relationship or to successfully free herself from the batterer. Financial
reasons alone, not considering other factors, cause many victims to return. In fact, the
greatest cause of homelessness for women and children in the United States is domestic
violence.51 If a victim is not truly ready to break free from the abusive relationship, a
decision to divulge confidential information may in effect cause the victim to remain in
the battering relationship longer in the future. If the victim comes to believe that her
lawyer cannot be trusted she will be reluctant to turn to the legal community in the future.
If a court is involved, it would be logical to expect that a hearing officer would
intervene and address safety issues with the victim prior to dismissing the petition or
order. This expectation, however, would not be well founded. Infrequently judges do
refuse to terminate civil protective orders given the seriousness of the allegations of
abuse but it is not predictable.52 Judges have been known to rescind protective orders
without questioning the safety of the litigant and, in extreme cases, have even advised the
victim that they are granting their request to rescind the order but, as a condition, they
never want to see that victim back in their courtroom again.53

50

People v. Basulto, 2003 WL 22456800, 4 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.), quoting the testimony of Jeri Darr, expert
witness in the area of domestic violence; Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of
Victimless Prosecution, 28 Seattle U. L. Rev. 301, 319 n.133 (2005) (citing Elaine Weiss, Surviving
Domestic Violence: Voices of Women Who Broke Free 41 (2000), providing that “[s]tatistics indicate that,
on average, battered women return to their batterers five times before they leave for good.”).
51
See ACLU Women’s Rights Project, supra note 22.
52
Information based on twelve years of experience representing battered women and data gathered from
student observations of civil protective order hearings as a requirement of their domestic violence seminar
course (on file with the author).
53
Information based on data gathered from student observations of civil protective order hearings as a
requirement of their domestic violence seminar course (on file with the author). See also Epstein, supra
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Similarly, counsel for the battered woman may have concerns regarding the
victim’s return to the abusive relationship and in response could request permission to
withdraw from the case on the grounds that the client insists upon taking action with
which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.54 Withdrawing from a domestic
violence matter, however, rarely solves the problem or reduces the danger.55 Further,
upon considering a motion to withdraw, it is doubtful that the court will understand the
attorney’s cryptic message that the client’s desire to rescind the protection order is not in
the client’s best interest.
Some would argue that an attorney who learns that a battered woman will remain
in or return to what can reasonably be defined as a dangerous relationship, should take
steps to protect that individual and “save” her from the abusive relationship.56 Others
argue that it is critical to support the victim, provide her with the appropriate resources,
but under all circumstances allow her to maintain autonomy.57
Counsel must also understand why a victim might remain in an abusive
relationship.58 The two leading theories that attempt to explain why the victim remains in
an abusive relationship are Learned Helplessness and the Survivor Theory.
The theory of Learned Helplessness was fashioned by Lenore E. Walker in 1979,
in her revolutionary and controversial book The Battered Woman.59 Walker uses Martin
note 39, at 40 (explaining that as a result of their lack of understanding of the dynamics of domestic
violence, some judges mistreat victims when they seek assistance after dropping a prior charge or civil
protective order. Epstein provides an extreme example of a Judge in North Dakota who told a victim, “If
you go back [to the perpetrator] one more time, I’ll hit you myself.”)
54
See Revised Model Rule 1.16 (2003).
55
If the attorney withdraws from the case another lawyer or the judge must deal with the problem.
Moreover, the client receives the message that counsel is no longer willing to assist her should she need
representation in the future, a message that the attorney may not have intended to communicate.
56
See Mia McFarlane’s discussion on the desire to “rescue the victim,” infra Part IX, note 268 and
accompanying text.
57
Id.
58
See Buel, supra note 6 (providing a comprehensive list of reasons why domestic victims stay).
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Seligman’s scientific research on dogs, which showed that “noncontingent negative
reinforcement” could cause the loss of motivation to respond, as a basis for why the
battered woman remains in the abusive relationship.60 As part of Seligman’s work he
placed dogs in cages and administered electrical shocks at random, the animals learned
that they could not control the shock not matter what their response.61 Although the dogs
attempted to escape initially, they soon learned that nothing they did stopped the
violence. Those conducting the experiments concluded that as a result of the shocks, the
“dogs ceased any further voluntary activity and became compliant, passive, and
submissive.”62 The researchers altered the experiment by leaving the doors to the cage
open, allowing the dogs an escape route. The dogs however, did not attempt to escape or
avoid the shocks and “it took repeated dragging of the dogs to the exit to teach them how
to respond voluntarily again.”63 Walker likens the battered woman to the dogs in
Seligman’s experiments and portrays her as a weak and “helpless” individual who has
been beaten into submission.64 She explains how repeated battering diminishes the
victim’s motivation to respond causing her to become passive.65 Walker provides that the
theory has three basic components: (1) information about what will happen; (2) cognitive
representation (i.e., learning or expectation); and (3) behavior, explaining that the second
component is what is critical to the theory of learned helplessness; if the individual
believes that she has no control, even if that it not accurate, she will act according to her
59

See generally Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman (1979).
Walker at 45-47.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. Walker discusses similar experiments conducted on cats, fish, birds, rats and other animals to support
the phenomenon of learned helplessness. The concept, however, of comparing a battered woman to a dog
or other animal shocks the conscience.
64
Id. (“Once the women are operating from a belief of helplessness, the perception becomes reality and
they become passive, submissive, ‘helpless’.”)
65
Id. at 44 – 54.
60
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belief.66 Walker’s solution to the plight of the victim who is experiencing learned
helplessness is to persuade her to leave the batterer, a psychological “dragging” of the
victim from the abusive relationship.67 She suggests that the victim must learn that she
can control what happens to her, possibly through psychotherapy or counseling. Such a
notion, however, supports the view that it is the victim and not the abuser who is in need
of treatment.68
Edward Gondolf and Ellen Fisher reject Walker’s theory and propose that the
battered woman is a survivor who responds to battering through help-seeking efforts.69
Gondolf and Fisher explain that past research in the area of domestic violence has
addressed the wrong question, “Why do battered women return to their batterers?”70 The
authors explain that the question we should be asking is why do we allow this abuse to
continue?71 Through this alternative theory they explain that if the battered woman is
provided with appropriate resources she will be able to remove herself from the abusive
relationship.72 According to research conducted by Gondolf and Fisher, victims make an
“average of five out of eleven positive efforts to stop the abuse.”73 They argue that the
victim seeks help in relation to her safety and the safety of her children. Further, that the
battered woman has not learned to be helpless but has in fact made a conscious choice to

66

Id. at 47. (“Once we believe we cannot control what happens to us, it is difficult to believe we can ever
influence it, even if later we experience a favorable outcome.”)
67
Id. Walker’s use of the word “dragging” is not in the literal sense but in terms of the victim’s need for
some undefined psychological cleansing before she can truly rid herself of the batterer.
68
The writer has a fundamental disagreement with the notion that the victim is in need of psychotherapy.
Such a theory only supports the misguided belief that it is the victim and not the abuser who should receive
treatment.
69
Gondolf and Fisher, supra note 18, at 11.
70
Id. at 3.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Callahan citing Gondolf and Fisher, supra note 39, at 125.
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maintain the relationship because it is simply safer to do so.74 They describe the victim
who remains in the abusive relationship as a “heroically assertive and persistent
individual,”75 debunking the theory that the battered woman is passive and helpless.
According to the survivor theory, the problem lies with society and its ineffective
response to victims, leaving them no meaningful and safe way out. 76 Others who have
considered the help-seeking strategies of the battered woman maintain that research
available on this subject supports Gondolf and Fisher’s belief that the victim does in fact
respond to domestic violence through help-seeking efforts and not by helplessness.77
The theory an attorney accepts will ultimately influence his or her response to the
victim-client’s decision to remain with the abuser. Those who support a Learned
Helplessness theory may argue that the victim must be rescued from the abusive
household at any cost, even at the price of compromising client safety. Those who agree
with the Survivor Theory may conclude that the victim is the best predictor of her own
safety and that in order to assist her in eventually and safely removing herself from the
abuse, counsel must protect her confidences, win her trust and provide her with an open
door through which she will one day safely walk.
IV.

The Unique Relationship
Believe her. When a victim seeks legal assistance, she is trusting you despite the
fact that she has been betrayed by others…. Understand that you alone are not
responsible for saving any person’s life...78

74

Gondolf and Fisher, supra note 18, at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
76
Id. at 18-19. The survivor theory supports the view that it is not the victim, but instead the abuser who
needs to change his behavior.
77
Callahan, supra note 39, at 128.
78
See American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence, The Impact of Domestic Violence on
Your Legal Practice at I-2 (1996) (quoting A Letter to Lawyers by Melissa Morbeck, a survivor of domestic
violence).
75
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It is important to understand that the special relationship between the attorney and
the battered woman must alter and influence the lawyer’s decisions in determining how
and when to act for the protection of the victim-client.
An attorney-client relationship is one based on trust and confidence. 79 The “core
component”80 of that relationship is the preservation and protection of confidential
information. Legal scholars have described the duty of confidentiality as an integral part
of the “trusting relationship.”81 Further, courts have held that not only is confidentiality
the cornerstone of the attorney-client relationship but that a client seeks representation
not simply to win the case, “…. but for the peace of mind that their interests are being
taken into account and protected.”82 The rules that guide our profession similarly define
the fundamental principle of the relationship as the attorney’s protection of information
that relates to that relationship.83
In contrast, the domestic violence relationship is one of distrust and fear. Victims
learn that they cannot rely on those who society suggests should love and protect them.
As a result, the victim-client may be slow to believe others who are placed in a position
of protecting her interests. In order for a victim to feel safe with her attorney she must
learn to trust counsel and be secure in the knowledge that confidences will not be
betrayed.
Because of the unique relationship between the victim and her attorney, counsel
must be acutely aware of how his or her actions will affect the victim’s decision-making
79

See generally Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering (3rd ed. 2001). xxx
In re Thomas Pressly, 628 A.2d 927, 931 (Ver. 1993) (mandating discipline for counsel’s disclosure of
confidential communications.)
81
See Martyn, supra note 12, at 1328 (2003)(“Confidentiality promotes both the individual rights of citizens
and the trust that is central to a client-lawyer relationship. It is a fundamental ethical value, part of the
implied understanding integral to a trusting relationship.”)
82
In re Thomas Pressly, 628 A.2d 927, 931 (1993).
83
Revised Model Rule 1.6, Comment 2.
80
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now and in the future. Counsel must earn the victim’s trust through a series of
interactions demonstrating to the battered woman that the attorney understands her plight
and will act in a manner that is in keeping with the victim’s choices regarding her case.84
All victims of domestic violence are unique and will require a different time table. Some
victims will be slow to trust their counsel and others will welcome the relationship and
have confidence in their attorney rapidly. Similarly, some attorneys will have the ability
to connect with particular victims-clients in a greater way than with others.
Further, victims will not always fit the prototypical mold of what society
envisions for them. Some women are strong survivors, which may lead counsel and
others to questions the veracity of their stories.85 Attorneys, judges and others may ask,
“If she is so strong, how could she have lived in the abusive relationship for so long?”
Other victims will come to the table with problems such as drug or alcohol use or abuse
which can cause counsel to judge them and possibly find them to be less deserving of
assistance because of these challenges. According to Julia Weber, one result of a
victim’s substance abuse problem may be a shift in the court’s focus from the issues of
domestic violence and the perpetrator, to the parental fitness of victim.86 Somehow the
battered woman is now seen as responsible for her problems.87 For a victim of domestic
violence, this can be the ultimate betrayal from a system that asked her to come and seek

84

See Revised Model Rules 1.2, for the attorney’s ethical obligation to “abide by the client’s decisions”.
See Linda Kelly, Stories From the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence
Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 665, 700 (1998). Kelly explains that, “to avoid the misconception
that all battered women are ‘helpless victims,’ special concerns are raised when confronted with a female
victim who appears to be a ‘strong’ woman, expressing not only strength, but anger, aggressiveness, or
power.” Kelly cautions that “restraint must be practiced” to ensure that the victim is not denied
“credibility” as a result of her strength. Id.
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help only to respond to her plight by declaring that the abuse is in some way her fault.88
The legal profession must move beyond these, as well as other stereotypes, to meet our
professional duty to provide competent representation to clients who come to the table
with multiple and complex issues.
As noted above, it can take a survivor of domestic violence five or more attempts
to leave the abusive relationship before she can permanently and safely stay away.89
Unlike other areas of practice, the victim-client may seek advice from counsel over an
extended period of time before she is prepared to take action. Further, we have seen that
mandatory arrest initiatives and “no drop” policies which attempt to force the victim to
leave her abuser before she is ready can backfire.90 The adult victim must be prepared to
leave on her own accord. If the victim has learned from past experience that she is
unable to trust her attorney, it is unlikely that she will seek assistance from any lawyer in
the future. Victims who return to an abusive relationship and then learn that counsel has
violated their confidence will quickly learn that the relationship is not one of trust.
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Id. Weber describes this phenomena as the “bait-and-switch,” explaining that:
In this scenario, a mother experiencing domestic violence seeks recourse in the family court. The
court, faced with the need to make a decision regarding child custody, considers both parties’
behavior and decisions within the context of the relationship…. From the court’s standpoint, there
may be genuine concern about a child’s well-being for a number of reasons. For example, the
court may have evidence of an abused parent’s drug use…. However, in this scenario, from the
standpoint of the victim the guiding principle of ‘best interest of the child’ ultimately pits the state
against a mother who chose to access the court system.
Weber maintains that at such a point the court is concerned with child safety only, to the detriment of the
victim and her safety concerns, in the end the result could be detrimental to the help-seeking efforts of
victims. Id. at 27.
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King-Ries, supra note 50.
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See generally Linda G. Mills, Institution and Insight: A new Job Description for the Battered Woman’s
Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA Women’s L. J. 183 (1997)(data suggests that
arrest actually increases violence for some women and that mandatory prosecution may be harmful to the
victim in some cases); Contra Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7
UCLA Women’s L. J. 173 (1997)(rejecting the argument that choice empowers the victim and counters
with the position that “[s]upporters of ‘no drop’ domestic violence policies realize that empowering victims
by giving them the discretion to prosecute, in actuality, only empowers batterers to further manipulate and
endanger their victims’ lives…”).
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Further, if the attorney as a representative of the legal system is seen as a traitor, the legal
system becomes a system to distrust for the battered woman.
V.

The Rules that Guide Us
An uncertain privilege…. is little better than no privilege at all.91
The history and transformation of the duty of confidentiality is important in the

context of client protection because that history provides insight into how we come to
know one of the most liberal exceptions to the duty to protect client communications to
date. The 2002 changes to Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), allow the attorney to act for the
protection of any individual whom the lawyer is reasonably certain faces substantial
bodily harm or death.92 The rule no longer requires that the disclosure be dependent upon
the client’s intent to commit a criminal act that would result in physical harm or death,
but can be made pursuant to a “broader” set of circumstances .93 This new exception
opens the door to an unlimited number of situations upon which the attorney might act
for the protection of the client or other individuals, while providing little guidance on
how and when to apply the rule. Moreover, the new exception creates an uncertainty for
the client who puts her trust and faith in an attorney she believes will keep her
confidences.
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Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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rules of professional conduct (ethics 2000) to the house of delegates (2002) (According to the report’s
explanation of changes, “[t]he commission is proposing a substantial expansion of the grounds for
permissive disclosure under Rule 1.6. While strongly reaffirming the legal profession’s commitment to
core value of confidentiality, the Commission also recognizes the overriding importance of human life and
the integrity of the lawyer’s own role within the legal system.” Id. at 49.)
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The duty of a lawyer to protect his or her client’s confidences has long been
recognized by the legal profession.94 The Canons of Professional Ethics first established
a duty of confidentiality in 1928, although the tenets were originally codified in 1908.95
While Canon 37 made clear counsel’s duty to protect client confidences, the drafters also
acknowledged that the duty was not absolute. According to Canon 37:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client’s confidences. This duty
outlasts the lawyer’s employment, and extends as well to his employees; and
neither of them should accept employment which involve the disclosure or use of
these confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his employees
or to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even
though there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not
continue employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the
performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing the
truth in respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a client to commit a
crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound to respect. He
may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or
protect those against whom it is threatened.96
Other than protecting himself, expressly enumerated within Canon 37 is an
exception that specifically allows the attorney to disclose client confidences to prevent a
crime or to protect those who are threatened. The canon, however, required the
expressed intention of the client to commit a crime in order for the disclosure to be made
and did not contemplate situations under which crimes are not involved.
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See David Lew, Revised Model Rule 1.6: What Effect Will The New Rule Have on Practicing Attorneys?,
18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 881, 882 (2005); See also Emiley Zalesky, When Can I Tell a Client’s Secret?
Potential Chages in the Confidentiality Rule, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 957, 959 (2002) (providing a
comprehensive overview of the history of confidentiality).
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Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 37 (1928)[hereinafter Canons]. The Canons were first established
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was added. See Lew supra note 94, at 882. See generally James M. Altman, Considering the ABA’s 1908
Canons of Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2395 (2003). Altman provides a comprehensive look at the
historical development of the Canons. See also Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §2.6.2 at 53
(1986).
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In 1969, the American Bar Association replaced the Canons with the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.97 The canons contained in the new Model Code continued
the tradition of placing a high value on the duty of confidentiality but was more
restrictive than Canon 37. Canon 4 of the Model Code did not expressly allow an attorney
to reveal confidential information to prevent physical harm.98 Instead, the canon required
that the lawyer preserve the confidences and secrets of the client as part of the fiduciary
relationship.99 Several exceptions to the duty can be found in Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)
of the Model Code, one of which allows the attorney to reveal the client’s intention to
commit a crime if revealing the information is necessary to prevent the commission of
that crime:100
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
….
(3)The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.101
The Model Code fails to address the potential for harm or injury to anyone. It
appears that the focus of the Code is the prevention of the commission of crimes and not
the protection of individuals.
The ABA significantly revised the applicable standards in 1983 when it published
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.102 Model Rule 1.6 relating to client
confidentiality allowed for disclosure, absent client consent, in only two circumstances:
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See Wolfram, supra note 95, at §2.6.3. The Model Code was made up of canons, ethical considerations
and disciplinary rules. According to Wolfram, the canons were made up of “preliminary statements”
containing “general concepts,” whereas the disciplinary rules were mandatory in nature and the ethical
considerations provided aspirational goals. Id. at 58-59.
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Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969) Canon 4 [hereinafter Model Code].
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Model Code Canon 4.
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(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated
in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;103
Original Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) requires both an intended criminal act on the part
of the client and at least a serious physical injury before the attorney is permitted to
disclose confidential information. Lawyers are prohibited from disclosing confidential
information relating to the likely physical harm to others unless the client intends to
commit a crime that would result in “imminent” death or substantial bodily harm. By
requiring that death or harm be imminent it would appear that the drafters intend to allow
disclosure in only those circumstances where the harm is likely to result in the near future
and not to provide an exception for remote occurrences. In fact, the comments consider
the issue of an attorney’s ability to predict harm and suggest “[t]hat is very difficult for a
lawyer to ‘know’ when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client
may have a change of mind.”104 It seems apparent that the framers of the Original Model
Rules anticipated how problematic it would be to require counsel to attempt to predict
when an individual may or may not act in a harmful manner in the future. Further,
attorneys could take some comfort in the knowledge that their decisions should not be the
subject of review by disciplinary bodies. The language contained in the Scope of the
102

See Wolfram, supra note 95, at §2.6.4.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter Original Model Rules].
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See Original Model Rule 1.6 Comment 13. It should be noted, however, that the comments serve as
guides to interpretation of the rules and are not intended to be authoritative. See the Scope of the Original
Model Rules Paragraph 21. The same language regarding the purpose of the comments can be found in the
Scope of the Revised Model Rules.
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Original Model Rules, expressly recognizes the attorney’s ability to exercise discretion
not to disclose confidential information pursuant to Rule 1.6 and recommends that such
discretion should not be subject to reexamination.105 This language, however, did not
survive future revision of the Model Rules.
In 1997, the ABA established the Ethics 2000 Commission to review and if
necessary to propose changes to the Model Rules.106 One of the rules affected by this
review is Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) which was amended in 2002, maintaining the most liberal
exception relating to an attorney’s discretion to disclose confidential information for the
protection of a human life to date. The new rule allows for the disclosure of confidential
information to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm regardless of
an intended criminal act on the part of the client.107 The following language of Revised
Model Rule 1.6 (b)(1), provides the privilege to protect against harm as follows:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;108
Revised Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) may be brief but it is far from uncomplicated. By
removing the “crime” component of the rule the ability of attorneys to disclose
105

Paragraph 20 of the Scope of the Original Model Rules contained the following language: “The lawyer's
exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to reexamination.
Permitting such reexamination would be incompatible with the general policy of promoting compliance
with law through assurances that communications will be protected against disclosure.” The Scope of the
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confidential information to protect against harm is broader. No crime must be
contemplated for the attorney to make a disclosure. In addition, the removal of the
qualifier “imminent” broadens the scope of harms included within the meaning of the
rule, requiring extensive analysis on the part of the attorney in determining the possibility
of future harm.
In addition, the Scope of the Revised Model Rules no longer cautions against the
reexamination of the attorney’s decision not to disclose under Rule 1.6, thus opening the
door to the possibility that disciplinary bodies, courts and juries could revisit the
attorney’s decision. Further, although the Scope of the Revised Model Rules holds that a
violation of the rules should not give rise to a cause of action against the attorney,
additional new language specifically provides that the Rules do establish standards of
conduct.109 This new language may support the possibility of private tort actions on the
part of the client or third parties against counsel for failing to act reasonably within the
standards of conduct expressed by the revised rules. It remains to be seen what, if any,
unintended consequences will result from these significant changes to Rule 1.6(b)(1) and
the Scope of Revised Model Rules.110

109

Scope of the Revised Model Rules paragraph 20.
See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers (2000), (hereinafter Restatement Third). The
Restatement Third §66, acknowledges a lawyer’s right to disclose client confidential information to prevent
death or serious bodily harm, not withstanding the lack of criminal intent or act. Section 66 provides
guidance to the lawyer on what he or she must do prior to disclosing confidential information. According
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Because Revised Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) is relatively new, approved by the ABA in
2002, not all states have adopted the language.111 Some states continue to use the
language of Original Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) or the Model Code. As a result, there would
seem to be some relief for attorneys practicing in states that have chosen not to adopt the
language of Revised Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) and the new language in the Scope of those
rules.112
It has been argued that one reason for the revision of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), is that
the new version of the rule places the protection of life over what some maintain is less
important, trust.113 But quite the opposite can be argued in the context of intimate
partner violence, where trust may equate to life. Without trust in one’s counsel there
may be no way out of the abusive relationship for a victim of domestic violence.114
Proponents of the recent change to the bodily harm exception also claim that historically
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As of October 2005, eighteen states (Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
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disclosure of confidential information in order to prevent harm, notwithstanding the commission of a crime.
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Legal Ethics 1003, 1013-5 (2004).
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the rules protecting client confidentiality have prevented attorneys from “doing the right
thing.”115 But, in the case of domestic violence the “right thing” may not be so obvious.
Some legal scholars assert in support of the protection exception that the need to
act for the protection of the client or others is so remote and unlikely to occur in practice
that it is not a pressing issue. Professor Susan P. Martyn argues that a lawyer is justified
in disclosing confidential information “to promote the greater good of preserving human
life,” basing that assumption on the additional conclusion that “… the situations in which
a lawyer might act to prevent this kind of harm are so few [emphasis added] that creating
such an exception does little to destroy the utility of confidentiality in encouraging clients
to speak.”116 Although Professor Martyn accurately reports that the issue rarely arises in
other areas of practice, the exception is very important to the practice of domestic
violence law. “Domestic violence”, by definition, involves violence. It logically follows
that violence is foreseeable in this area of practice.
VI.

Confidentiality, Client Protection and Our Courts
The lawyer’s obligations will depend in part upon the circumstances of
each case, and upon the experience, wisdom and skill at human relations
of the lawyer to whom the disclosure is made. There is also a need to
balance the law’s longstanding policies concerning the protection of
human life against customary professional standards involving the
preservation of client confidences and secrets.117
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For the attorney faced with the difficult decision of how and when to act for the
protection of the client, the potential reaction of our courts and disciplinary bodies may
be significant.
a.

Confidentiality and the Attorney- Client Privilege

The duty of confidentiality applies generally to all communications made by the
client to the lawyer, as well as “all information relating to the representation, whatever
the source.”118 The attorney-client privilege on the other hand applies only to situations
in which the lawyer is called to testify or produce evidence related to those confidential
communications, in a judicial or related proceeding.119 The distinction is important
because permitting the attorney to disclose information for the protection of a life should
not necessarily waive the privilege to avoid testifying against one’s clients. To hold
otherwise may make lawyers reluctant to act for the protection of those who are in
serious danger.120
Our courts have long recognized the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege. In 1826 the Supreme Court found in Chirac v. Reinicker that “[t]he general
rule is not disputed, that confidential communications between client and attorney, are
not to be revealed…”121 Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court in Chirac
explaining that to ensure justice is served, the privilege must be held by the client, not the
attorney.122 And in Upjohn, Justice Rehnquist provides a historical overview of the
Court’s response to what it considered to be the oldest of the privileges for confidential
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communications, the attorney-client privilege.123 Providing that the purpose of the
privilege “… is to ensure full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”124 Justice Rehnquist reasons that the public is served by the
client receiving “sound” legal advice which can only be provided once the attorney has
been fully informed by the client.125 The privilege allows the client to inform the
attorney without fear that those confidences will be disclosed.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the issue of disclosure in the
context of the attorney-client relationship in Newman v. State of Maryland.126 The
attorney in Newman, during a conference with his client and her friend in preparation for
an upcoming custody case, learned that his client intended to kill one of her children and
blame the killing on her husband.127 As a result, counsel disclosed the statements made
by his client to the judge assigned to the case. The trial was postponed twice and the
client was ordered to undergo supervised visitation. Prior to the trial the client’s friend
broke into the husband’s home and shot him. The State attempted to use the statements
previously made by counsel to the judge in the subsequent conspiracy case against his
123
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Id. at 389.
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client. The Court decision supports the notion that the attorney’s disclosure of client
confidential communications to prevent injury or death is discretionary in nature.128 In
addition, the Court confirmed that the testimonial privilege remains, supporting the
notion that the disclosure of confidential information to protect another does not
necessarily destroy the attorney-client privilege. According to the Court in Newman,
anything less would have both a chilling effect and create an adversarial relationship
between the attorney and the client.129 Courts have been cautious in allowing the use of
disclosed confidential communications in subsequent judicial proceedings based on the
valid concern that lawyers will be less likely to “come forward” if they believe that such
information will be used against their client in the future.130
b.

An Obligation to Protect the Client

Keeping in mind counsel’s duty of confidentiality, we turn to whether there is any
obligation on the part of counsel to protect the client who is placing herself in a life
threatening situation. Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) is permissive in nature providing that the
lawyer may reveal information necessary to prevent the harms considered by the rule. It
would seem from a reading of the rule that the decision to disclose is at the sole
discretion of the lawyer and not mandated by the rule.
Although there is no case law or bar opinions directly on point, there may be
some guidance in cases dealing with an attorney’s duties and responsibilities after a client
has disclosed the intent to commit suicide. Cases, such as People v. Fentress, suggest
that lawyers may have a higher moral obligation to protect our clients from their own
128

Newman at 340. See also Purcell v. Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436, 440 (1997) (finding that counsel
had no ethical duty to disclose a client’s intention to commit a crime but did have the discretion to disclose
such information to protect the lives of others).
129
Newman at 333. See also Purcell, 424 Mass. 109, 676 N.E.2d 436 (1997)
130
Purcell at 440.

37

actions.131 In that case, an attorney, Wallace Schwartz, received a call from an old friend
Albert Fentress, who informed Schwartz during that telephone conversation that he just
killed someone and was about to take his own life. 132 The New York County Court in
Fentress found that the client waived confidentiality because he intended to have the
homicide revealed to the police.133 Despite the conclusion that there was no duty of
confidentiality given the waiver and thus no attorney-client privilege in any subsequent
judicial proceeding, the court chose not to ignore the broader social issue and the
potential impact its decision could have on future cases. The court maintained that in
general the ethical obligation to keep client confidences secret “must be measured by
common sense.”134 Further, that if the duty of confidentiality exist for the protection of
the client, “…. what interest can be superior to the client’s life itself?”135 The court
suggested that it would be morally wrong, in the face of such dangers, to choose to be
silent in name of confidentiality.136 The decision stopped short of providing any clear
answer to the issue of client protection in accordance to any ethical rule of conduct. It is
possible that the court chose not to decide the issue of a disclosure outside the facts of the
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case because to do so would require extensive analysis unrelated to the issue at hand and
unnecessary given the waiver. On the other hand, the court may have chosen to avoid
directly addressing the sole issue of protecting a client who threatens suicide and the duty
of confidentiality because New York ethical rules did not appear to allow disclosure
unless the client intended to commit a crime.137 Pursuant to New York law at the time of
Fentress, the decision to commit suicide was not a crime.138
The Fentress court cited a New York State Bar Opinion from 1978, written a few
years prior to the decision.139 The Opinion directly addressed the issue of whether an
attorney may disclose a client’s intention to commit suicide.140 Of note is its opening
paragraph.141 The New York State Bar skillfully summed up in a few words the conflict
faced by the attorney under such difficult circumstances, as a choice between the moral
obligation to protect “human life” and the professional obligation to protect client
confidences. The drafters explained that the easy choice presents itself when the
disclosure occurs under circumstances unrelated to legal advice. Under such
circumstances the obligations pursuant to the Model Code in place at the time, would not
apply and thus the attorney is advised to take “whatever steps” he or she deems
appropriate to prevent the client from attempting to commit suicide.142 The drafters
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explained that in such a situation the attorney is no different than a “friend or other
confidant.”143
The more difficult situation arises when the client discloses the intention to harm
oneself during the course of representation. The Bar Opinion acknowledged that the
provisions of Canon 4 of the Model Code, in place at the time of the decision, would
apply. Thus, the information would be considered confidential within the meaning of DR
4-101(a) and no exception to the rule appears to be applicable because attempted suicide
is not a crime under New York law. Nonetheless, the drafters reason that the information
could still be disclosed. The Opinion provided a winding analysis arriving at an
interesting and yet somewhat baffling conclusion. First, the exception pursuant to DR 4101(c)(3), allows disclosure to prevent a crime and so, in states that consider attempted
suicide a crime, attorneys would be permitted to disclose confidential information should
they deem such actions necessary to prevent the harm.144 Interestingly, because New
York repealed attempted suicide as a crime in 1919, the writers of the opinion could not
easily argue disclosure pursuant to the exceptions to their confidentiality rule. In order to
justify disclosure the argument was made that, “there are certain principles of conduct
which a lawyer is obligated to uphold by the very nature of his office and its relationship
to society,” explaining that the preservation of human life is the most basic of the
principles to which they are referring.145 The writers suggested that the repeal of
attempted suicide as a crime did not in any way change the intended social goal of the
preservation of human life and in so finding, they were “compelled” to argue that a
client’s disclosure to commit suicide is akin to proposed criminal conduct pursuant to DR
143

Id.
Id.
145
Id. at 443.
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4-101(c)(3).146 How they make the argument that a non-crime is considered akin to a
crime within the meaning of the Code is fascinating and should cause attorneys in states
that have not adopted the Revised Model Rules pause. Do all lawyers, despite the rules
of their particular jurisdiction, have the moral obligation to place the potential risk of
harm above all other interests?
The question of disclosure, however, is dependent upon the specific facts and
circumstances of the case presented.147 Even the drafters of the New York Bar opinion
acknowledge that there are circumstances under which an individual’s decision to end his
or her life should be kept confidential.148
c.

Common Law Duty & Tort Liability Cases

Although there are tort cases holding that under particular circumstances some
professionals have a duty to reveal professional confidences to protect third parties, such
cases involve situations far different from those faced by the domestic relations attorney.
For example the Supreme Court of California in its landmark decision in Tarasoff 149
considered the issue of patient statements relating to potential harm to third parties and
the resulting question of disclosure of that confidential information by therapists for the
protection of third persons. The Court held that when a therapist determines, or should
146

Id.
Id. (explaining that “…a lawyer’s actions… must depend upon the particular circumstances present,
taking into account policies respecting the protection of human life…”).
148
Id. The opinion provides as an example the client who may be contemplating suicide over a painful,
terminal illness and how counsel may choose to keep confidential such a revelation by the client who is
competent and is knowingly making such as choice over an obviously unpleasant alternative.
149
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, (Cal. 1976). It is undisputed that Prosenjit Podder, a
patient of Dr. Lawrence Moore, advised Moore that he intended to kill Tatiana. Subsequent to his
statement to his psychologist, Podder killed Tatiana Tarasoff. Id. at 339-340. For detailed facts see People
v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344-345 (Cal. 1974), Tanya Tarasoff met Prosenjit Poddar in the fall of 1968 at
folk dancing classes and although Podder thought otherwise, Tarasoff was not interested in an intimate
relationship with him. Id. Upon learning that Tarasoff was not interested, Podder became depressed and
finally sought the assistance of a psychologist but did not continue seeing him. Id. On October 27, 1969,
Podder arrived at the home of Tanya Tarasoff “armed with a pellet gun and a kitchen knife.” Id. Podder
shot her, she ran, but he caught her and stabbed Tarasoff to death with a kitchen knife. Id.
147
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determine, that a patient is a serious risk of violence to another, that individual “… incurs
an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such
danger.”150 Tarasoff can be distinguished from others cases because a failure on the part
of the therapist to predict future harm was not at issue, the therapist in Tarasoff believed
that his patient would in fact kill Tatiana Tarasoff.151 The issue in the case was not a
failure to predict, but a failure to warn.152 Another important factor is that the Court in
Tarasoff considered the matter in the context of the professional standards of the medical
profession, specifically the duty of therapists,153 and not as to the general ability of the
average citizen to predict future harm.154 There were those on the California Supreme
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Tarasoff at 340.
Id. at 345.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Some courts reject Tarasoff entirely, given the difficultly of predicting future dangerousness. For
example, because of the significance of this issue the District Court of Appeals of Florida for the Third
District in Boynton v. Burglass, on its own motion granted rehearing en banc to determine whether to adopt
the decision in Tarasoff. See Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The Court in
Boynton explained that to impose a duty to warn or protect others “… would require the psychiatrist to
foresee a harm which may or may not be foreseeable, depending on the clarity of his crystal ball.” Id. at
450. The Court ultimately refused to find that a psychiatrist has a duty to control a voluntary outpatient or
to warn potential victims because the psychiatrist in Boynton lacked the control necessary to find a duty
given the voluntary outpatient status of the patient. Id. at 499. The outcome seems to be dependent on the
existence of control in the relationship, if the ability to control the patient is removed than there may be no
duty. Id. This is an interesting perspective because the same argument can be made in the case of the
attorney representing the victim of domestic violence. The relationship between the attorney and the
battered woman does not give rise to the ability to control her actions. Not only is control an issue but the
Court in Boynton also expresses concern about the reliability of predictions of future harm in any situation.
Id. at 488. The court in Boynton also stressed that currently the science of predicting dangerousness is just
not sufficient to provide for accurate predictions of future harm. Id. at 451. The Supreme Court of
Delaware in Naidu v. Laird also considered this issue and maintained that as a general rule an individual
has no duty to prevent harm to others by controlling the conduct of another. Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064,
1072 (1988). The Court noted, however, that there are exceptions to that rule where a “special relationship
exists” which would impose an obligation to control the conduct of another or which gives rise to a right to
protection.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 315 (1965)). According to Justice Christie, of the
Delaware Supreme Court, there is no bright line rule as to whether there is a duty and that the finding of a
duty “must be formulated in each particular case in light of its particular facts.” Id. at 1070. The Court in
Naidu ultimately concluded that because a special relationship existed between Dr. Naidu, a psychiatrist,
and his patient Mr. Putney and because of a broad-based obligation on the part of psychiatrists to “protect
the public from unreasonable danger,” that Dr. Naidu owed a duty to protect the victim in that case. Id. at
1072. The determination of the special relationship was based on two facts: (1) the eight year relationship
between the psychiatrist and the patient and (2) the doctor’s firsthand knowledge of his patient’s
“longstanding and continuing dangerous propensities.” Id. The Court did clarify that, “recognition of an
151
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Court who did not entirely support the decision in Tarasoff, arguing that predictions of
violence are unreliable.155 Judge Mosk, in his concurring and dissenting opinion,
explained that he concurred in part because the therapist did predict harm and thus the
issue “was very narrow.” 156 What Judge Mosk did not agree with is the majority’s
decision that a therapist has an obligation “pursuant to the ‘standards of the profession’”
to predict harm in the first place.157 Mosk questioned what professional standards would
be used to make such predictions.158
Tarasoff and cases like it involve the duties of psychiatrists, psychologists and
psychotherapists, persons professionally trained to assess intent and human emotions.
Lawyers, by contrast, lack such training. Second, and more important, Tarasoff and like
cases, involve disclosures of intent made by the potential attacker, not the potential
victim.
Determining whether the Tarasoff rule can be extended to attorneys is the first
step in deciding whether a lawyer owes an affirmative duty to protect a victim-client.159
Although courts such as Fentress have been willing to support the choice of an attorney
to act for the protection of others, 160 they have been reluctant to find an absolute duty on

affirmative duty owed persons other than the patient does not mean that the psychiatrist is liable for
negligence of the patient. Rather, the psychiatrist will be liable only when his own negligence is
responsible for the injury in question.” Id. at 1074. Using the Court’s logic in Naidu, the initial inquiry
would be whether the attorney owes an affirmative duty to protect the victim-client. The second issue
relates to the question of whether the attorney’s failure to act for the protection of the client is the
proximate cause of the victim’s injury.
155
Id. at 354 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
156
Id.
157
Id.(referring to People v. Burmick, 535 P.2d 352 (1975)).
158
Id.
159
See People v. Dang, 93 Col. App.4th 1293, 1297 (Cal. Ct. App 2nd Dist 2002). The Court in Dang raises
but never answers the question of “whether the principles announced in [Tarasoff] apply to attorneys.”
160
See Section V., Subsection b. An Obligation to Protect the Client, notes 125 - 141 and accompanying
text.
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the part of lawyers to warn foreseeable victims.161

In Hawkins v. Kings County, Frances

M. Hawkins unsuccessfully attempted to sue her son’s court appointed attorney, Richard
Sanders, for negligence and malpractice.162 The facts of the case reveal that the client’s
psychiatrist informed Sanders that his client, Michael Hawkins, posed a danger to himself
and to others, and warned that Michael Hawkins should not be released from custody.163
At a subsequent bail hearing, counsel failed to provide information to the court about the
danger his client posed and the client was released from custody.164 A few days after his
release, Michael Hawkins assaulted his mother and attempted to kill himself.165 As a
result of his attempted suicide, jumping off a bridge, Michael’s legs were amputated.166
The Court in Hawkins explained that disclosure of confidential information by an
attorney in order to prevent harm to others is not required by the ethical rules.167 The
Hawkins’ court did, however, agree that the common law duties addressed in Tarasoff
support the position that an attorney must warn foreseeable victims, once counsel has
learned that a client intends to harm another.168 Interestingly, Hawkins makes clear that
any protective action on counsel’s part should be optional “unless it appears beyond
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Hawkins v. Kings County, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that disclosure of confidential
information is not required by law and further any common law duty to warn would not apply unless there
exists an unknowing victim). Contra, Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the “Dangerous” Patient:
Inplications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 Emory l.J. 263, 333-336 (1982) (arguing that
Hawkins can not be so easily distinguished from Tarasoff). Other courts have found that a lawyer has a
duty to warn at least in the context of a real threat made to a Judge. See State v. Hansen, 852 P.2d 117
(1993). The Court in Hansen explained that it could be distinguished from Hawkins because the third party
in Hawkins had notice of the danger; in Hansen the judge was unaware of the danger. Id. at 122. Further,
the court in Hansen concluded that the attorney, as an officer of the court, had a duty to warn the judge. Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 340
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Hawkins at 365.
168
Id.
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reasonable doubt” that harm is likely to occur to an unknowing individual.169 In this
case the court concluded that Frances Hawkins, the victim, was fully aware of the risks
her son posed and as a result was a knowing victim.170
Even Hawkins, however, did not have before it the question of what, if any, duties
the lawyer had to his or her client, especially a client who knows as much or more than
the lawyer about the risk she is facing.171
Clearly the attorney owes a duty of care to his or her own client.172 The standard
of care for an attorney has been defined by the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing
Lawyers as “the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar
circumstances.”173 What, however, is the standard of care normally exercised by
attorneys representing victims of domestic violence under similar circumstances? Unlike
therapists who receive extensive training to identify and deal with individuals who pose a
risk to society, attorneys are not trained in or possess such knowledge. As a
consequence, if we expect an attorney to act for the protection of a victim of domestic
violence the lawyer may be required to make decisions about how and when to act for the
protection of the client based on risks that even the experts are unable to predict.174
In addition, there are significant public policy reasons why we should not find
civil liability on the part of an attorney for failing to act for the protection of their victim
169

Hawkins at 365 (referring to the position presented by amicus curiae).
Id. at 345.
171
It may be logical to conclude, given the court’s position in Hawkins, that there should be no duty on the
part of an attorney to disclose or warn unless there is an unknowing victim and there is no question that
harm is likely result. Further, that any decision to protect would be purely optional so long as the attorney
were to act reasonably and ensure that the client is made fully aware of the risks associated with remaining
in or returning to the abusive relationship.
172
See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 50 (2000).
173
See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 52 (2000). Further, a violation of a rule of
professional ethics does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action for negligence. Id.
174
Playing the Psychiatric Odds supra note 12; See also Neil Websdale, Ph.D, Lethality Assessment Tools:
A Critical Analysis (2000).
170
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client. Recognizing a duty to protect may result in over reporting by attorneys thus
resulting in the reluctance on the part of victim of domestic violence to seek legal
representation, for fear that their confidences will be violated. Moreover predictions of
future harm in domestic violence cases are unreliable and sometimes the act of disclosure
can put the client at greater risk. Although there are important reasons why an attorneys
should not have a duty to disclose confidential information to protect a victim client, that
does not mean that the attorney does not have a duty to inform the client of the risks she
faces, and provide her with the information necessary to make an informed decision
about how to act in her own best interest.175
VII.

Predicting Lethality and Dangerousness
…we are asked to embark upon a journey that “will take us from the world of
reality into the wonderland of clairvoyance.”176
Advocates maintain that domestic violence is the single major cause of injury to

women in the United States and that in one hour more than 200 women are battered by
their husbands.177 The risks are undeniable. The problem is that it is difficult, if not
impossible, for the average attorney to determine which cases will end in further
violence and which will not. As a result, the response to a victim-client who returns to a
violent relationship may require the use of risk assessment measures that counsel may
not know of or be ill equipped to employ.
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See text sections XI and XII.
Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)(citing the concurring and dissenting
opinion in Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 354). The foregoing statement sums up accurately the difficulty of
predicting future harms.
177
Barbara J. Hart, Parental Abduction and Domestic Violence, Unpublished paper presented at American
Prosecutors Research Institute, Boston (1992) (on file with the author).
176
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Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict lethality in domestic violence
cases, experts suggest that many of the risk factors associated with domestic homicide are
good predictors of “dangerousness.”178 Some of those risk factors include access to guns,
use of a weapon in abusive episodes, a history of domestic violence,179 threat of suicide,
drug or alcohol abuse, sexual abuse and control issues.180 These factors alone or in
combination can be found in many domestic violence relationships that do not end in
death or serious bodily injury.181 In fact, research has shown that less than one percent of
battered women are ultimately killed by their intimate partners, confirming that homicide
is rare in most domestic violence cases.182 This finding alone may lessen counsel’s
concerns regarding the issue of certain death,183 but the question of substantial bodily
harm is not so easily dismissed.
The matter of recidivist battering is difficult to assess given the conflicting
research available. Risk assessment in the area of domestic violence is very new.184 The

178

Websdale, supra note 174, at 5.
See Judge Amy Karan and Lauren Lazarus, A Lawyer’s Guide to Assessing Dangerousness for Domestic
Violence, 78-MAR Fla. B.J. 55 (2004) (the number one indicator of risk of future harm or lethality is a
history of domestic violence).
180
Websdale, supra note 174, at 2. See also Etiony Aldarondo & Fernando Mederos, Men Who Batter:
Intervention and Prevention Strategies In A Diverse Society, NY Civic Research Institute, Ch2 at 9 (2002)
(identifying the following risk factors to be assessed: (a) prior history of domestic violence; (b) access to
handguns; (c) estrangement from the abuse victim; (d) history of depression; (e) stalking behavior; (f)
abusive behavior during her pregnancy.” Further, acknowledging that the likelihood of lethality increases
with the following additional factors: (a) the presence of threats or fantasies of homicide or suicide, (b)
history of dependency or jealousy, (c) rape history, access to abuse victim or her family, (d) sense of
entitlement, (e) ownership of abuse victim, and (f) sociopathic and narcissistic tendencies.”)
181
Information based on extensive experience representing victims of domestic violence.
182
Websdale, supra note 174, at 1 (citing the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998). See also Aldarondo and
Mederos, supra note 180, at 9 (finding that “it is important to recognize that risk assessment has its own
dangers. Incorrect predictions of violence (i.e. false positives) are the rule because homicides are relatively
rare events”).
183
This is not to say domestic homicide is insignificant. According to the U.S. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics for 2003, approximately 1,300 women are killed each year by an intimate
partner. See also Karan, supra note 179.
184
P. Randall Kropp, Some Questions Regarding Spousal Assault Risk Assessment, 10 Violence Against
Women 676, 693 (2004)(“…spousal violence risk assessment methods are in their infancy…”); See also
Janice Roehl, et al., Intimate Partner Violence Risk Assessment Validation Study: The RAVE Study
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only issue upon which experts seem to agree regarding risk assessment in intimate
violence cases is that there is little consensus on how to assess risk in this area.185 In fact,
it has been said that those studying this issue cannot even agree on how to define risk.186
Some research shows that approximately 50% of domestic abusers reassault their
victim once an abusive incident has occurred,187 while other studies indicate that a
majority (61%) of abusers who commit a violent act against their intimate partner do not
engage in violent acts in the future.188 Even from this conflicting research, however, it
appears that abusers tend to reassault at a rate of at least 39%. The risk is very real.
Given the high percentage of battered women who may be reassaulted, there is a
great need to determine which clients are at greater risk of future harm. Several risk
assessment tools are available to interveners who wish to attempt to determine the
dangerousness of the situation. Of note are the following methods:189 (1) Danger

Practitioner Summary and Recommendations: Validation of Tools for Assessing Risk from Violent Intimate
Partners, U.S. Department of Justice at 15(“…the science of risk assessment is young.”)
185
Kropp at 677.
186
Kropp at 679 (explaining that the lack of consensus in defining risk causes several problems, one of
which may be comparing risk assessment studies).
187
See Sarah M. Buel, Taking Domestic Violence Seriously: The Role of Lawyers, Judges and Probation
Officers at 32 (2003) available at http://safestate.org/documents/dv_seriously.pdf (citing Edward W.
Gondolf, Batterer Intervention Systems; Issues, Outcomes and Recommendations 200 (2002)(“Professor
Gondolf’s research indicates that while almost half of the men recidivated within the 4-year follow-up,
most did so within the first 9 months after starting a batterer’s intervention program.” See also AMA
Diagnostic & Treatment Guidelines on Domestic Violence, SEC: 94-677:3M:9/94 (1994) available at
http://abanet.org/domviol/stats.html (“47% of men who beat their wives do so at least 3 times per year.”).
188
Brian K. Payne & Randy R. Gainey, Family Violence and Criminal Justice: A Life-Course Approach
123 (2002) (reviewing several studies that followed wife assault over a period of time found that although
one-third of men who abused their partners in the first year of the relationship continued that abuse in the
future, the majority of abusers (61%) did not commit acts of violence in future years. The authors,
however, acknowledge that a follow-up study confirmed that higher levels of conflict in the marriage and
lower socioeconomic status were predictors of continuing violence over time). See also Edward W.
Gondolf , Do Batterer Programs Work?: A 15 Month Follow-Up of Multi-Site Evaluation 3(5) Domestic
Violence Report 65-66, 78-79 (June/July 1998) (finding reassault rates were approximately one-third.
Interestingly, over half of those who committed future abusive acts did cause physical injury to their
victims, confirming the likelihood of serious bodily injury.
189
Roehl, supra note 184, at 2 (providing a comprehensive study of the risk assessment tools available in
the area of domestic violence).
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Assessment Instrument;190 (2) DV-MOSAIC;191 (3) Domestic Violence Screening
Instrument;192 and (4) Kingston Screening Instrument for Domestic Violence.193
The first assessment tool mentioned, the Danger Assessment Instrument was
created by Jacqueline C. Campbell in 1985.194 The instrument is available at no cost for
use by individuals working with victims of domestic violence to assist in making
determinations about the risk of homicide to a particular victim.195 The form consists of
two sections to be filled out in the course of interviewing the victim. The first section
asks the victim to use a calendar and indicate the approximate dates during the past year
when the victim was beaten by her perpetrator, indicating the severity of the abuse using
a scale provided. The second section of the form is a survey comprised of yes or no
questions relating to the increase in severity or frequency of violence; use of weapons;
drug and alcohol use; threats to kill victim, children or self; control issues; threats by the
abuser to commit suicide; possessiveness and other issues.196 On June 2, 2005, Campbell
was interviewed regarding her danger assessment tool. Campbell acknowledged that,
“[w]hile the danger assessment is available online, the results of the self-tests are best
interpreted by professionals, who can more accurately determine lethality, or the chances
190

Jacqueline C. Campbell, Danger Assessment (1985,1988, 2001) available at
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/DANGERASSESSMENT.pdf; Roehl, supra note 184, at 2 (describing the
Danger Assessment survey by Campbell as a 20 yes or no question survey for the victim to determine the
risk of dangerousness or lethality).
191
Roehl, supra note 184, at 2 (describing the DV-MOSAIC by Gavin de Becker & Associates as a
“computer-assisted method that includes 46 multiple response items about risk and protective factors….”)
192
Id. (recounting the Domestic Violence Screening Instrument by Williams & Houghton as a 12 question
survey for the abuser relating to criminal history, employment and other risk factors).
193
Id. (explaining the Kingston Screening Instrument for Domestic Violence by Gelles involves 10
questions to be answered from abuser and victim interviews, as well as a review of other information).
194
Danger Assessment supra note 190.
195
Danger Assessment Instrument available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/DANGERASSESSMENT.pdf
or for the prior version available at http://www.nvaw.org/research/instrument.shtml. The form is provided
at no cost to users, however, Campbell requests that those who duplicate the instrument provide the results
of any research which is conducted based on use of the instrument or the approximate number of
participants with whom the instrument was used.
196
Id.
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of the abused woman being killed.”197 Although at first glance Campbell’s statement
might appear discouraging it is actually beneficial because it provides a warning to the
attorney to seek the assistance of experts when interpreting the data.
The second assessment tool evaluated is the DV-MOSAIC. The DV-MOSAIC,
among six mosaics,198 was created by Gavin de Becker for use by law enforcement and
domestic violence advocates as a tool to assess and ultimately determine which domestic
violence cases are likely to escalate.199 The tool is available for purchase online.200 In
1995, de Becker began developing the MOSAIC system for assessment of domestic
violence matters, which is now used by police departments for case assessment.201
Although the DV-MOSAIC has been described as a computer program, de Becker
explains that it is not a computer program per se, although it draws on computer
technology to teach the method. He explains the MOSAIC as follows:
MOSAIC is a way of breaking down a situation to its elements, then organizing
and identifying the most important factors. MOSAIC includes a computer-assisted
guide that takes users through assessments in a step-by-step format, suggesting
the specific areas of inquiry experts feel will most contribute to a quality
assessment. MOSAIC asks the user questions about the situation, and offers a
range of possible answers.
As answers are selected, MOSAIC prompts the user to explain why a particular
answer applied to the situation. That information is automatically organized into a
written report that sets forth what areas of inquiry were explored or considered,
what information was learned, what conclusions were reached, and why.
197

Katherine Rosenberg, Danger Assessment System Targets Domestic Violence, expert from Johns
Hopkins University to speak in Rialto, Victorville, California Daily Press, June 2, 2005 available at
http://www.vvdailypress.com.
198
Gavin de Becker has created six different mosaic systems including: (1) DV MOSAIC for assessing
domestic violence cases; (2) MAST to be used by high-school and elementary schools for assessing student
threats; (3) MAST-U for use by university police and administrators for assessing student threats; (4)
MAT-W to be used by various agencies and businesses to assess threats made in the workplace; (5) MAPP
for government agencies for assessing threats to public figures; and (6) MAJ available to government
agencies to assess threats made against judges available at http://www.mosaicsystem.com.
199
Mosaic Threat Assessment Systems, a Gavin de Becker company, available at
http://www.mosaicsystem.com.
200
Id.
201
Id.
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At relevant points in the process, users are presented with training videos by
leading experts, and resource material including articles, reports, instructive case
histories, research papers, statistical information, summaries of past incidents,
relevant laws and public policies, and important cautions and suggestions from
leading experts. 202
The MOSAIC is more involved than the hands-on approach by Campbell, which
requires the completion of a simple handwritten form and/or interview.
The third tool is the Domestic Violence Screening Instrument (DVSI) by
Williams & Houghton which is described as a 12 question survey for the abuser relating
to criminal history, employment and other risk factors.203 It is different from the Danger
Assessment tool in that the assessment is based primarily on data provided by the abuser,
not the victim. The Kingston Screening Instrument (K-SID), the fourth tool, is a ten
question survey for both the abuser and victim, with the additional requirement of a
criminal history evaluation of the abuser. Neither the DVSI nor the K-SID, are readily
available for general use by the public. Further, because these two approaches require
data from the abuser that may not be feasible to obtain, they may not be as useful to the
domestic violence attorney.
Several experts considered the foregoing tools in a comprehensive study to assess
the accuracy of different approaches to predicting future harm in domestic violence
cases.204 In addition, they considered the victim’s own “assessment of risk” as part of the
study.205 The findings show that all of the forgoing risk assessment methods were far
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Id. The DV-MOSAIC is available for purchase through de Becker’s company website.
Roehl supra note 184, at 5.
204
Roehl, supra note 184, at 1 (interviews were conducted of 1307 victims of domestic violence and the
history of arrest of all perpetrators involved was determined).
205
Id. (explaining Goodman and Dutton’s victim assessment of risk is comprised of two questions asked of
the victim as to her belief that she may be physically abused or injured).
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from perfect in predicting risk.206 Although the experts agree that Campbell’s Danger
Assessment performed slightly better than the other three assessment tools,207 without
additional research, they could not firmly recommend any one approach over another for
risk assessment in intimate partner violence.208 The authors acknowledge that the tools
could yield results that are not much better than chance, but recommend that those
working in the area of domestic violence continue to assess risk with any means
available,209 warning that when assessing risk great weight should be given to the
victim’s own view about the possibility of danger.210
There has been extensive debate about the amount of weight to give to the
victim’s perception of risk in a particular domestic violence case. Although some
academics have argued that battered women do not always appreciate the risk they
face,211 the majority of victim advocates maintain that the victim is the best predictor of
her own safety, stressing the importance of considering the victim’s own assessment of
risk.212 Given the lack of research relating to this proposition and some indications from
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Id. at 14 (explaining that they found both false positives and false negatives with all methods and that
more accurate methods could reduce such problems.)
207
Roehl supra note 184, at 13.
208
Id. at 14.
209
Some advocates suggest that assessing lethality is not necessarily counsel’s responsibility. See Burman
supra note 17, at 242, who finds that it would be reasonable for the lawyer to “discharge that
responsibility” by referring the client to an advocate or other individual who may be better trained to handle
such functions. Although Burman is clear in his belief that it is not reasonable for the lawyer to do nothing
at all.
210
Roehl, supra note 184, at 14 (explaining that “victims are fairly good predictors of their own risk, yet
not accurate enough to depend on alone for risk assessment.”). Kropp, supra note 184, at 685 (clarifying
that although one of the most significant predictors of harm is the victim’s perceptions, that victims may be
better at predicting when they are at risk than when they are safe).
211
Karan, supra note 179 (citing a study by Oregon Health and Science University, Portland. “out of 30
women who survived an attempted homicide by an intimate partner, 14 stated they were ‘completely
surprised’ by the attack.”).
212
Dr. Lesley Laing, Risk Assessment in Domestic Violence, Australian Domestic & Family Violence
Clearinghouse at 8 (2004)(“Victim advocates have stressed the importance of listening to women’s
assessments of their partner’s dangerousness,” referencing Hart 1994 and de Becker 1997 as cited by
Weisz, Tolman & Saunders 2000, Assessing the risk of severe domestic violence: The importance of
survivors’ predictions’, Journal of Interpersonal Violence, vol 15 no 1 pp 75-90.)
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past studies suggesting that there is merit to considering the victim’s own perceptions of
danger, D. Alex Heckert and Edward W. Gondolf conducted a study to test the predictive
power of the victim’s perceptions of risk.213 They began by considering some risk
indicators relating to the abuser’s characteristics that have been identified as factors in
predicting continuing violence, although the indicators have been deemed to be weak in
their predictive power.214 The risk factors are prior assault, alcohol or drug abuse,
criminal history, the existence of psychological problems, failure to follow through with
support programs and being abused as a child.215 The study was extensive, including 840
batterers and 82% of their victims (688 women) and was conducted over a fifteen month
period with interviews performed every three months.216 To evaluate the victim’s
“perceptions of risk,” victims were asked two questions at the time of the initial intake.
The responses to the first question, “[h]ow safe do you feel at this point?” were placed in
three answer categories: “1 = uncertain, not safe, in much danger, 2 = somewhat safe, 3
= very safe.” 217 The responses to the second question, “[h]ow likely is it that your
husband will become violent towards you during the next 3 months?” were placed in four
answer categories: “1 = very likely, 2 = uncertain/don’t know, 3 = unlikely, and 4 = very
unlikely.” 218

The first aspect of the assessment conducted by Heckert and Gondolf was

“how much women’s perceptions contribute to prediction of repeated reassault above and
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beyond men’s characteristics and reports.”219 What they found was the prediction rate
went from 55% when considering just the abuser’s variables and reports to a 70%
prediction rate when a woman’s perceptions were added.220 They did, however, discover
that the findings were not straightforward because when a victim felt at greater risk she
was more likely to take protective action, thus reducing the risk.221 But, when the victim
felt uncertain about her safety she was less likely to seek help and as a consequence was
at a greater risk of harm. The findings do show, however, that a victim’s perception that
she is at risk of future harm is “a reasonably accurate predictor of repeated reassault by
themselves and improve the prediction of risk factors and instruments.”222 Heckert and
Gondolf maintain that these findings are important not only because they support the
longstanding argument that many victims are good predictors of their own safety but also
because they send a message to those working with battered women that they should pay
attention to the victim’s self appraisal of risk.223
Given these findings, it may seem illogical that disciplinary bodies and our courts
could place attorneys in the difficult position of evaluating and predicting what experts
can not even begin to determine. Dr. Neil Websdale has described risk assessment in
domestic violence cases as an “art not a science.”224 In fact, he agrees that it is the victim
who in some instances is the expert.225 If the victim, who may be a good predictor of her
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own safety, concludes that it is safer to remain in or return to the abusive relationship,
who are we as non-experts to conclude differently. The foregoing tools, the Danger
Assessment Instrument in particular, along with the client’s own assessment of the risk
she faces, can certainly aid counsel in helping the client make those difficult decisions.
VIII. Limited Role of Model Rule 1.14
… embrace the world of gray…226
It has been suggested that aggressive intervention may be necessary for the
protection of those battered women who are so “coercively controlled,” that they are
unable to act in their own best interest.227 Proponents argue that a guardian may be
required to act for the victim, under extreme circumstances, when she is unable to make
appropriate decisions on her own behalf.228 The problem with such an argument is that it
opens the door for abuse of discretion by those individuals making the determination of
what choices are in the best interest of the client. Is counsel truly faced with a
circumstance where the client is unable to make appropriate choices on her own behalf or
is it a situation where the client is making decisions with which the attorney has a
fundamental disagreement? Given this dilemma, Model Rule 1.14, which allows the
attorney to take protective action for a client at risk, may prove to be of limited
usefulness in the area of domestic violence.229 According to Revised Model Rule 1.14:
(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority,
mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
226
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(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity,
is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken
and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take
reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or
entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate
cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.
(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity
is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph
(b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information
about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's
interests.230
Not unlike Rule 1.6, Model Rule 1.14 has undergone some revisions in recent
years.231 Elizabeth Laffitte suggests that one of the most notable changes is in the title of
the Rule itself. Prior to Ethics 2000, the rule was titled “Client Under a Disability,” now
the rule is titled “Client with Diminished Capacity.”232 The title of the Rule’s new
version suggests that there is no expectation that the client has a disability but, instead,
that the client’s impairment, however short lived, in some way adversely influences the
decisions she makes, thus placing the client in danger. This change appears to allow
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attorneys to act for the protection of a greater number of individuals by broadening the
definition of impairment. Laffitte suggests that this significant change “urges the lawyer
to embrace the world of gray—the real world where the lawyer ideally will take each
client and each fact pattern into consideration, thus acknowledging that there is a
continuum of capacity rather than absolutes.”233
The title, however, was not the only change to the rule. Original Model Rule 1.14
required that the attorney must reasonably believe that the client cannot adequately act in
his or her own interest before taking protective action.234 Revised Model Rule 1.14, on
the other hand, requires that three specific elements must be met prior to taking protective
action: (1) that the client has diminished capacity; (2) that there is a substantial risk of
physical, financial or other harm; and (3) the client cannot adequately act in her or his
own best interest.235 The new version of the rule, however, does not define what should
be considered when making a determination of impairment. Laffitte contemplates the
dilemma faced by counsel in determining whether the client is impaired and suggests the
attorney could borrow from the medical profession’s model as follows: “The health
profession relies on ‘decisional capacity’ which consists of three elements: (1) possession
of a set of values and goals; (2) the ability to communicate and understand information;
and (3) the ability to reason and deliberate about one’s choices.”236 The third element,
the ability of the client to reason and deliberate about her choices, may be the most
helpful factor to legal practitioners when assessing whether a victim-client has
diminished capacity. If the client lacks the ability to reason and deliberate about her
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choices the attorney could find pursuant to the rule that the client is in need of protective
action, if such inability to make decisions places the client in danger.
The inability to reason is very different from the ability of the client to reason and
ultimately make a choice with which counsel has a fundamental disagreement.237 There
are many life decisions that competent adults make on a daily basis that, were they
subject to review, would not be considered prudent by other adults acting under similar
circumstances.238 Similar arguments have been made under the old rule as we will see
below. The power of either version of Rule 1.14 is tremendous, creating the potential for
abuse by providing counsel with the ability to override the client’s wishes anytime the
attorney deems those decisions imprudent.239 Moreover, taking action pursuant to Model
Rule 1.14 runs counter to the general presumption of that an attorney should abide by the
client’s decisions in accordance with Model Rule 1.2. As a result, the comments to
Model Rule 1.14 consider the potential adverse effect such disclosure may have on the
client’s interests, cautioning the lawyer to first determine whether his or her disclosure
will adversely affect the client’s interests.240
If the lawyer is able to determine that client is in need of protective action,
figuring out what protective action should be taken is another difficult issue faced by
counsel in applying this rule. The comments to Model Rule 1.14, consider the issue of
taking protective action and provide that when the client lacks the ability to make
237
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adequately considered decisions the lawyer may take protective measures deemed
necessary.241 The comments provide examples of protective measures including
contacting the client’s family members or “other individuals or entities that have the
ability to protect the client.”242 The rule does not provide further guidance regarding
who those “other individuals” might be, leaving counsel to assume that the rule may be
speaking of law enforcement or other protective agencies. Further complicating the
issue is the concern raised by the comments that the lawyer must consider to whom they
intend to make the disclosure and whether that individual will act adversely to the
client’s interests.243 Will telling family members or law enforcement that the client is in
danger adversely affect the client and if so, should the lawyer act for the protection of the
client? One possible result of the disclosure to the police could be the removal of the
children from the household by a state agency, which certainly would be adverse to the
client’s and possibly the children’s best interest.244 The comments to both versions of
the rule acknowledge that the position in which the attorney is placed under such
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circumstances is “an unavoidably difficult one [emphasis added].”245 In the case of the
victim of domestic violence, if the lawyer can determine that the protective action would
in fact place the client in more danger does it naturally follow that the attorney should
not act?
With regard to disclosure, the drafters of the new version of Rule 1.14 added
paragraph (c) to directly address the issue of confidentiality.246 While holding that
communications are protected by Rule 1.6, the rule provides that disclosure is “impliedly
authorized to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests.”247 The
comments do caution that the rule limits what the attorney may disclose when acting for
the protection of the client.248 The standard is to disclose as little information as
necessary.249
In line with the Fentress decision, what interest is more important than the client’s
safety?250 A number of states with confidentiality rules which would otherwise forbid
the disclosure of information for the protection of the client have used Rule 1.14 as an
alternative means of allowing the attorney to act for the protection of the client.251 As
recently as 2005, a formal opinion of the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee
245
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maintained that Rule 1.14 permits disclosure “when the lawyer reasonably believes that
the client cannot adequately act in the client’s own best interest.”252 The question that
gave rise to the Alaska opinion related to the possible statement to counsel that the client
intended to commit suicide if convicted.253 The Alaska Bar acknowledged that the
State’s current Rule 1.6,254 would appear to prohibit the disclosure of a client’s intent to
commit suicide because the exception applies when the client engages in criminal
conduct and suicide it not a crime in the State of Alaska.255 However, in the committee’s
view Rule 1.14 can override Rule 1.6 in particular circumstances. 256 That circumstance
is when the client cannot adequately act in his or her own best interest. In such
situations the attorney may take protective action pursuant to Rule 1.14. The committee
explained that in their view, the purpose of the “protective action” language is to allow
the attorney to safeguard the health and safety of the client who is unable to act on his or
her own behalf and in doing so may disclose the client’s intent to harm him or herself.257
In a similar opinion, the Connecticut Bar Association Committee of Professional Ethics
considered the issue and concluded that although “a lawyer should be respectful of the
client and not substitute her judgment for that of the client,” the attorney may do so when
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the client’s capacity to act in his or her own interest is compromised.258 Although both
the Alaska and Connecticut opinions support a privilege to act for the protection of the
client they emphasize that the rule is permissive, not mandatory.
The State Bar of New Mexico had a very different view regarding the issue of a
client’s expressed intent to harm him or herself. According to an advisory opinion, the
State Bar of New Mexico maintained that because suicide is not a crime, the lawyer who
learns of the client’s intent to commit suicide may only disclose such intent pursuant to
client authorization.259 Further, the committee found that if there is no possibility of any
crime or fraud, the attorney has no duty to act. The committee, however, only
considered the issue as it relates to confidentiality and not as it relates to the client’s
capacity to make informed decisions.
The question of how this issue relates to the battered woman can be understood by
considering recent scholarship in the area of domestic violence. In line with the concept
of Learned Helplessness,260 it has been suggested that a few battered women are so
“coercively controlled” that aggressive intervention is the only answer.261 According to
Ruth Jones, the coercively controlled battered woman is described in the context of the
most severe domestic violence cases,262 and distinguished from other abused women
depending on the perpetrator’s “ strategy of ‘violence, intimidation, isolation, and
258
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control.’”263 Jones maintains that because the coercively controlled battered woman is
unable to act on her own behalf, she may require that someone else act for her.
Supporters of this view insist that the appointment of a guardian on behalf of the battered
woman is the solution for an individual who is unable to protect herself.264 This is an
interesting perspective as it assumes that the battered woman is unable to act in her own
best interest.265 It is suggested by those that support this model that a family member or
other individual can petition for guardianship of the battered woman if they can
demonstrate that the abuser has placed the victim at risk of serious bodily injury or even
death.266 This issue, however, has only been considered in the context of a guardianship
proceeding by family or friends and not in relation to any ethical dilemma by counsel.
Although the issue of attorney involvement is not addressed by theorists of the coercively
controlled battered woman model, the argument could naturally apply in the context of
the attorney faced with the victim-client who can be defined as a coercively controlled
victim. That is, if you accept this theory in the first instance. If so, the argument that the
battered woman has diminished capacity could be presented and thus relief would be
available to counsel. As discussed, according to Model Rule 1.14, when an attorney
reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity and is at risk of substantial
physical, financial or other harm, the attorney may take reasonably necessary protective
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action.267 The protective action provided by Rule 1.14, also includes the appointment of
a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.
The question, however, relates to whether the client has the ability or lack thereof
to make reasoned choices about her situation. Is the client unable to make appropriate
decisions on her own behalf or is the client making a decision with which the attorney
simply does not agree? It is the extreme set of circumstances involving a victim, who is
so severely beaten, battered and controlled that may require drastic measures. Such
decisions, as we have seen, are not easily made. Taking protective action, however, can
be seen as a violation of the client’s autonomy. If the facts reveal that a client is making
a reasoned choice to remain with the abuser because it is the safest option, the attorney’s
professionalism could also be called into question.
IX.

Client Autonomy
“Although tempting, practitioners should avoid the pitfall of rescuing the
[client].”268
The desire to assist others is why many lawyers enter the practice of law in the

first place. But our goal to help others may sometimes get confused with the desire to
“rescue” or save our client from what we deem to be the wrong or inappropriate course
of action. In the area of domestic violence, such conclusions by the attorney can prove
deadly for the battered woman.
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The client’s absolute right to make decisions on her own behalf has been hotly
debated. There is great support for client autonomy as evidenced by legal scholarship in
the area,269 as well as the language of Revised Model Rule 1.2. 270 As Professor Jason
Kilborn explains, the attorney-client relationship and the view of client autonomy were
clearly established by the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers. “The
Introductory Note to Chapter 2 of the Restatement, which is devoted to ‘the clientlawyer relationship,’ states at the outset that the relationship of the client and lawyer is
one of principal and agent.”271 It naturally follows according to Professor Kilborn that
the client, as principal, is in control, not the attorney. “Agents, after all, are not entitled
to determine the principal’s ‘best interests’ and act in contravention to the principal’s
stated desires; they must either follow lawful instructions or withdraw from service.”272
It is thus the position of some legal scholars that the relationship between lawyer and
client precludes the attorney from interfering with the decisions of the client, with a few
exceptions such as circumstances arising under Model Rule 1.14.273 In keeping with this
argument a review of Revised Model Rule 1.2, provides direction to the lawyer that he or
she “shall abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation.”274 The language recited from Revised Model Rule 1.2, is identical to
the language of Original Model Rule 1.2.275 Furthermore, similar language can be seen
in the predecessor to the Model Rules, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
269
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According to DR 7 -101 of the Model Code, the lawyer shall not fail to seek the lawful
objectives of the client.276
There are those who argue that sacrificing client safety in the name of client
autonomy causes counsel to compromise his or her moral standards.277 The analogy,
however, is typically made in the context of a client’s explicit threat to harm oneself or
another individual. In such instances the decision to disclose information for the
protection of the client is made when there is a high probability of immediate harm, “not
merely a circumstantial possibility” that harm will occur.278 This fine distinction can be
seen in the context of domestic violence, as it is compared to a threat of suicide or an
expressed threat to harm a third person. The threat of harm to the victim of domestic
violence is merely possible, whereas the threat to harm oneself or another individual may
be highly probable.
Mia M. McFarlane, in her look at mandatory reporting laws for healthcare
professionals, argues that physicians should avoid the desire to “rescue their patients.”279
This is an interesting perspective, given the expectation by our society280 and our courts
to hold doctors and in some cases even lawyers responsible for protecting (i.e.
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“rescuing”) victims.281 This motivation can be seen in the mandatory reporting in a few
states which require physicians to report domestic abuse over an adult-victim’s wishes.282
Opponents of mandatory reporting of domestic violence involving adult victims argue
that such reporting will discourage victims from seeking medical attention, compromise
victim safety and ignore patient confidentiality.283 McFarlane addresses the danger level
victims face and how, although reporting may make the individual making the disclosure
feel better, it may in fact place the victim in more danger.284 Instead of actually helping
the victim, deep down the reporter may be motivated not by a need to protect but by a
desire to be taken “off the hook.”285 By reporting the potential threat of harm the actor
“feels better,”286 but at what price? Attorneys may find themselves falling into the same
trap, wanting to rescue the clients when the victim, in fact, has no desire and possibly, no
need to be rescued.287
Those who support mandatory reporting of domestic violence by physicians
suggest that the potential dangers of reporting are not as great as the opponents suggest
and that reporting may, in fact, benefit victims by encouraging physicians to learn more
281
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about domestic violence, and thus provide enhanced services to victim-patients.288 Could
the same logic apply in the context of attorney disclosure for the protection of the victimclient? Some may argue that counsel will be forced to learn more about domestic
violence in an effort to balance the competing issues involved. Such an outcome could
be a positive one for battered women if the end result is a greater sensitivity on the part of
the attorney. However, if the end result is a breach of trust, negative consequences will
surely result.
X.

Investigation
The sheer number of incidents of domestic violence in this country make it clear
that lawyers who ignore domestic violence issues may profoundly harm their
clients and violate their professional and ethical obligations.289
Despite the difficulties, there is no question that it is appropriate and even

ethically responsible to assess risk of further domestic violence in the general context of
client representation. Risk assessment helps the attorney investigate facts, assess choices
available to the client, determine whether there is a need for emergency or ex parte relief,
and prepare for trial. The rules of professional conduct require all attorneys to make a
reasonable investigation of facts provided by the client in order to confirm that a good
faith argument can be made in support of the client’s position.290 In the course of this
case investigation domestic violence counsel should ask many of the questions associated
with risk assessment. This will help the attorney not only prepare for trial but will also
288
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help him or her evaluate the need for emergency relief. Counsel must learn whether there
is a past history of domestic violence because such information can be helpful in a
number of respects. First, it may help her or him uncover acts of violence or a course of
conduct serious enough to warrant entry of a civil protective order. It could also provide
information about potential witnesses who can testify as to the acts of violence, thus
bolstering the victim’s case at a future trial. It will aid counsel in assessing the victim’s
ability to recall the facts and circumstances of the history in the victim’s case thus
supporting the client’s claim that acts of violence have occurred. Further, the history of
violence must be the subject of future discussions between counsel and client, should the
victim decide to remain with or return to the abuser.
Similarly, counsel must learn about the perpetrator’s access to weapons and /or
use of weapons in prior acts of violence. Securing weapons is critical to ensuring victim
safety whether she is severing all ties with the abuser or choosing to remain. Further,
weapons introduced at trial can provide the kind of dramatic evidence lacking in many
civil protection hearings.
Another important inquiry is whether the abuser has a controlling nature. This
can help counsel assess how a particular perpetrator may react under certain
circumstances. Abusers who have displayed highly possessive actions in the past may be
more inclined to react negatively to a victim at the time she considers leaving. The
victim needs to be made aware of the dangers she faces by attempting to leave the
abusive relationship, just as she needs to be made aware of the dangers of remaining.291
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A detailed interview with the client about the perpetrators mental state, as well as
his drug or alcohol use can also shed light on the volatility of the abuser. Although
evidence of the abusers mental state alone may not guarantee the entry of a civil
protection order, in combination with acts defined by statute, such information can
provide counsel with valuable information about risk factors to be communicated to the
court when considering relief necessary to ensure the safety of the victim.
XI.

Communication & Safety Planning
Family Law may be one of the few areas of law where malpractice may be
committed solely by the attorney’s aggressively pursuing all legal remedies
available to the client…. Before the lawyer rushes into court… she may wish to
discuss with the client whether or not such action will increase the client’s safety
risks.292
Although counsel may not have an ethical duty293 or moral obligation to disclose

confidential information for the protection of the battered client, lawyers who represent
battered women do have other ethical obligations. The attorney must communicate fully
with the client, engage in safety planning, and put in place other safeguards to ensure the
protection of the client.294
Pursuant to Rule 1.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney
must explain the matter to the client in such detail that the client is able to make an
informed decision.295 In order for the client to make an informed decision about whether
to stay in an abusive relationship, counsel must discuss with the client the risks of
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remaining, as well as the risks associated with leaving her abuser.296 A legal remedy is
not always the safest and best answer for a battered woman.
Whether the client seeks to end the violent relationship or concludes that she will
remain, counsel must provide the client with the information necessary to develop a
safety plan. If she has not yet left the abuser, the attorney must make sure that when she
is ready to leave that she has identified a safe exit plan, a place to go and a way to get
there.297 The client should be ready if she needs to leave quickly by having a bag packed,
a list of people to contact and some money readily available.
Lawyers must also keep in mind that the act of seeking legal assistance can
potentially place a victim in greater danger.298 The American Bar Association
Commission on Domestic Violence addressed the issue of safety in The Impact of
Domestic Violence on Your Legal Practice. 299 Attorneys are advised to institute safety
measures when representing the victim.300 It is all too easy for an attorney to focus on
legal actions and outcomes and neglect to consider the unintended consequences of those
legal actions. For example, the victim-client may agree to the filing of a petition for a
civil protective order. The attorney drafts and files the necessary papers with the court
but does not consider what will happen after service of process nor what could happen to
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the victim before trial. For example, a case involving name calling and stale allegations
of low level physical abuse would not appear to warrant ex parte relief. In such a case,
the victim could wait a period of time for the trial to be scheduled. If counsel fails to tell
the client that papers will be served on the perpetrator prior to trial, a fact the victim may
likely be unaware of, the outcome could be deadly. The victim could be home one
evening with her abuser when the sheriff knocks on the door to serve a petition
containing allegations of abuse, as well as requests for relief such as a no contact order,
custody of the children, possession of the home, support and other ancillary relief. After
the door is closed and the abuser has an opportunity to review the documents, retaliation
could be swift and fatal.
In the alternative, service of process could cause the abuser to coerce the victim to
drop the matter. If the client decides not to pursue a civil protective order, counsel should
confirm that the victim was not encouraged by the abuser to drop the matter. Again,
proper action requires accurate information. It is legally sound to attempt to communicate
with the client to ensure she is safe and that her decision not to proceed was by choice. It
is another matter altogether to conclude that the client has been coerced without sufficient
information or to substitute the lawyer’s judgment for that of the client because counsel
believes that the only appropriate course of action for the client is to obtain a protection
order.
XII.

Conclusion
If we care about our character and conduct ourselves accordingly, we will be
able to sleep well at night301.
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Duty, loyalty, integrity, trust, and confidentiality are all fundamental attributes of
a member of the legal profession. There has been, nevertheless, a great deal of debate
over the struggle between a duty to one’s client and what many have argued is a higher
duty to the profession and society as a whole. The duty of loyalty may appear to create a
conflict between the attorney’s ethical obligation to safeguard the client’s confidences
and a moral responsibility to protect the client from the risk of physical harm. But the
issue as it relates to domestic violence is not as simple as choosing between the
protection of information and the protection of the individual.
Although the decision to act for the protection of the client should not be made in
haste, an attorney who has no question that the client is at risk may require an ethical
privilege to act to save a human life. Attorneys practicing in jurisdictions that have
adopted Revised Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), have such a privilege. But the decision to act
should be a right, not a duty. And the answer to this difficult issue may not lie within the
rules of professional conduct or any common law duty to protect individuals. The answer
may be found within the facts and circumstances of each case and sometimes in keeping
with the intuition of the lawyer making those decisions. There is no easy way to predict
which cases are lethal or so dangerous that they will result in serious physical harm.
And, there is also no way of determining when intervention will do more harm than good.
As a result, guidelines should be created to direct the attorney and aid him or her in
making the difficult decision of acting for the protection of the client. A written risk
assessment tool similar to the Danger Assessment Instrument302 should be added to Rule
1.6 to aid the attorney in the evaluation of each case. Further, the lawyer should be
required to ascertain the victim’s own assessment of the risk she faces and take such
302
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views into account before making decisions about client protection. In addition, a panel
of experts in the field of domestic violence should be available to serve as a resource for
lawyers in need of guidance on risk assessment and to provide direction on ethical issues
faced by lawyers representing victims of domestic violence.
Although there are obvious reasons to support the right of an attorney to act for
the protection of a life, the lawyer who is considering disclosing confidential information
for the perceived safety and protection of the victim-client should think long and hard
about the unintended consequences of such benevolent actions. 303 You may not want to
open one door only to close and lock all others, in the name of client safety.
Each case and client must be evaluated on the basis of the facts and circumstances
presented. The evaluation must be conducted in the moment and not by some arbitrary
process of retrospection. In keeping with the Scope of the Original Model Rules, an
attorney’s exercise of discretion not to disclose confidential information protected by the
rules should not be subject to reexamination.304 It naturally follows that the language of
the Scope of the Original Model Rules should be restored and maintained by the drafter
of the Revised Model Rules.305 To do otherwise, is to force the attorney representing
victims of domestic violence to predict the future.
Education is the key. Lawyers, who represent battered woman, must understand
the importance of client communication and the role of risk assessment. Law schools
must act as leaders and provide the knowledge and information necessary to prepare
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future and practicing lawyers for the real possibility that, at sometime in their legal
career, a human life may depend on the decisions they make.
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